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DISCOVERY ABOUT DISCOVERY: SAMPLING PRACTICE 
AND THE RESOLUTION OF DISCOVERY DISPUTES IN AN 
AGE OF EVER-INCREASING INFORMATION 
Charles Yablon & Nick Landsman-Roos† 
This Article provides the first extended academic consideration of a new 
practice adopted by an increasing number of courts to resolve e-discovery 
disputes—the sampling of a small portion of the information sought in 
backup or other relatively inaccessible files. We provide a comprehensive 
overview and statistical analysis of contemporary sampling techniques, 
identifying issues where sampling practice is inconsistent or where additional 
guidance appears to be required. Our aim is to provide a coherent theoretical 
approach to the use of sampling, suggesting “best practices” for many 
unresolved issues, and locating sampling practice within broader 
contemporary debates about discovery. 
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INTRODUCTION 
No subject in law is of more practical importance yet garners less 
theoretical attention than discovery in civil actions.1 In most 
contemporary complex litigation, it is the primary focus of the pretrial 
process—the source of most of the cost, motion practice, and lawyer 
effort—that ultimately brings about a resolution of the dispute. That 
resolution, in turn, is usually a settlement based largely on the results 
and potential costs of the discovery process.2 The advent of 
electronically stored data—so-called “e-discovery”—as a primary 
method of information storage and retrieval has resulted in discovery 
becoming even more complex, costly, and time consuming.3 
While there is a large and growing literature containing guidance 
for practitioners and judges supervising the discovery process,4 
theoretical discussions of the problems raised by contemporary 
discovery practice remain extremely rare, both in academic journals and 
appellate court opinions.5 Although the Supreme Court seems to have 
recently developed a strong interest in civil procedure—providing 
 
 1 Scott A. Moss, Litigation Discovery Cannot Be Optimal but Could Be Better: The 
Economics of Improving Discovery Timing in a Digital Age, 58 DUKE L.J. 889, 889–90 (2009). 
 2 See generally Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, An Economic Model of Legal 
Discovery, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 435 (1994) (discussing the effects of discovery on parties’ 
incentives to settle). 
 3 In 2007, $2.70 billion was spent on e-discovery, representing a 43% increase in the 
amount spent in 2006. See George Socha & Tom Gelbmann, A Look at the 2008 Socha-
Gelbmann Survey, LAW TECH. NEWS, Aug. 11, 2008. As of 2010 that figure has grown to $2.80 
billion. See George Socha & Tom Gelbmann, Climbing Back, LAW TECH. NEWS, Aug. 1, 2010. 
 4 See, e.g., Symposium, Navigating the Changing Ethical and Practical Expectations for E-
Discovery, 36 N. KY. L. REV. 445, 445–629 (2009). 
 5 For example, in a recent symposium issue of the University of Denver Law Review, 
participants were asked to choose any Federal Rule of Civil Procedure and discuss proposals for 
its revision. Of the six law professors participating in the symposium, none choose to discuss a 
discovery rule. Of the three judge participants, one wrote about discovery. Of the five 
contributions by practitioners, three were about discovery rules. See Symposium, Civil Justice 
Reform, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 213, 213–559 (2010). The theoretical literature that does relate to 
discovery has largely focused on cost allocation, as opposed to discussion of the ways in which 
courts should make such decisions. See Edward H. Cooper, Discovery Cost Allocation: 
Comment on Cooter and Rubinfeld, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 465 (1994); Bruce L. Hay, Effort, 
Information, Settlement, Trial, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 29 (1995); Cooter & Rubinfeld, supra note 2. 
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important new opinions in cases involving pleading standards, class 
actions, personal jurisdiction, and even Erie issues—the Justices have 
not seen fit to grant certiorari in any case primarily focused on civil 
discovery.6 The academic literature, which provides extensive analyses 
and critiques of other aspects of the civil litigation process, also tends to 
give discovery short shrift.7 
This is unfortunate, not just because of the practical importance of 
discovery, but also because concerns about the extent, cost, and burden 
of discovery lurk just below the surface in many recent Supreme Court 
decisions. For example, the controversial heightened pleading standard 
articulated in Twombly8 and Iqbal9 is expressly designed to protect 
certain defendants from the “burdens of discovery,”10 which are said to 
be “sprawling, costly and hugely time-consuming.”11 Critics of those 
decisions decry their curtailment of “broad discovery,” said to be one of 
the “integral, interdependent elements of the pretrial process.”12 The 
Supreme Court’s recent decision in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes,13 
which has been criticized for its extensive consideration of the merits on 
 
 6 A review of the discovery chapters of leading civil procedure casebooks reveals that the 
most recent Supreme Court decision relating to discovery is Mohawk Industries, Inc. v. 
Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100 (2009), which concerned the appealability of attorney-client privilege 
determinations, not the scope of discovery. See JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL, ARTHUR R. MILLER, 
JOHN E. SEXTON & HELEN HERSHKOFF, 2011–2012 CIVIL PROCEDURE SUPPLEMENT 571 (2011). 
The second most recent case is Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981), another case 
about evidentiary privileges rather than the discovery rules. See JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL, ARTHUR 
R. MILLER, JOHN E. SEXTON & HELEN HERSHKOFF, CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES AND MATERIALS 
908 (10th ed. 2009); LINDA J. SILBERMAN, ALLAN R. STEIN & TOBIAS BARRINGTON WOLFF, CIVIL 
PROCEDURE: THEORY AND PRACTICE 625 (3d ed. 2009); see also Joel Slawotsky, Rule 37 
Discovery Sanctions—The Need for Supreme Court Ordered National Uniformity, 104 DICK. L. 
REV. 471, 471 (2000) (“Nearly a quarter century has elapsed since the Supreme Court last 
addressed in a significant fashion discovery sanctions under Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure.”). 
 7 See Moss, supra note 1, at 893 (“Academics rarely focus on how courts decide discovery 
disputes (which, unlike trials, occur in most lawsuits), frustrating judges and parties alike.” 
(emphasis added)). Professor Richard Marcus provides a possible explanation for this relative 
lack of academic attention: a widespread acceptance among academics of the “Liberal Ethos,” 
the normative principle “that suits should be decided on their legal (substantive) merits and 
that procedure should be a Handmaid in that process.” Richard Marcus, Not Dead Yet, 61 
OKLA. L. REV. 299, 302 (2008). From this perspective, the changes made in the discovery rules 
since 1970 appear “retrograde” and, coupled with a general academic skepticism of 
practitioners’ charges of pervasive discovery abuse, have led to a general tenor of disapproval 
regarding more recent attempts to limit discovery. Id. at 304–06. As the argument that “it 
wasn’t broke and didn’t need fixing” is one of the less challenging forms of academic discourse, 
it is perhaps not surprising that discovery has attracted less academic attention than other 
procedural issues. 
 8 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
 9 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
 10 Id. 
 11 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 560 n.6. 
 12 Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 5 (2010). 
 13 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011). 
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a class certification motion,14 was justified, in part, by the very extensive 
discovery that had already taken place in connection with that motion.15 
And, in Smith v. Bayer Corp.,16 although the Court ultimately rejected 
the attempt to enjoin a state court class action based on the issue 
preclusive effect of a prior federal denial of class certification, Justice 
Kagan acknowledged that the “strongest argument” for such preclusion 
is the cost of such serial relitigation and its attendant pretrial practices.17 
So is discovery an expensive, burdensome thing whose abuses must 
be curbed, and coercive power minimized, whenever possible?18 Or is it 
an essential right and integral part of modern litigation practice,19 
enabling parties and courts to develop the information they need to 
resolve an underlying dispute? The answer is surely both, and recent 
changes in discovery practice and the Federal Rules make it increasingly 
imperative that judges find fair, transparent, and effective means for 
resolving discovery disputes in individual cases. Unfortunately, because 
of the relative lack of academic or appellate court guidance, trial courts 
do not have a good theoretical framework with which to analyze 
discovery issues in different litigation situations or to balance the 
various factors that are material to adjudication of discovery disputes 
under the Federal Rules. Accordingly, magistrate and district court 
judges have been forced to develop rules and practices on a largely ad 
hoc basis. 
This Article assists in developing a conceptual framework for 
contemporary discovery by providing the first theoretical and empirical 
analysis of a relatively new approach to resolving discovery disputes—
the sampling of a small portion of the requested information prior to 
ruling on the underlying dispute. Sampling is expressly endorsed in the 
Advisory Committee notes to the 2006 revisions to Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 26(b)(2)(B), one of the so-called “e-discovery 
amendments.”20 Even before that time, it was applied in a number of 
influential discovery cases, most notably district court Judge Shira 
 
 14 See generally Alexandra D. Lahav, The Case for “Trial by Formula,” 90 TEX. L. REV. 571 
(2012); Suzette M. Malveaux, How Goliath Won: The Future Implications of Dukes v. Wal-
Mart, 106 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 34, 38 (2011). 
 15 There had been over one hundred and seventy-five depositions taken and more than a 
million pages of documents and electronic personnel data produced in the class certification 
stage in the court below. See Brief in Opposition of Respondents at 10–11, Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. 
2541 (No. 10-277), 2010 WL 4220519 at *3. 
 16 131 S. Ct. 2368 (2011). 
 17 Id. at 2381. 
 18 For a recent critique of the current model of discovery cost allocation in which the 
producing party bears the expenses associated with its opponent’s discovery requests, see 
Martin H. Redish & Colleen McNamara, Back to the Future: Discovery Cost Allocation and 
Modern Procedural Theory, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 773 (2011). 
 19 See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., From Whom No Secrets Are Hid, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1665, 1694 
(1998) (arguing that discovery has achieved near-constitutional status in the United States). 
 20 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B) is titled “Specific Limitations on Electronically Stored 
Information.” 
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Scheindlin’s seminal discussion of e-discovery practice in Zubulake v. 
UBS Warburg LLC.21 It has become an increasingly popular technique 
for adjudication of discovery disputes, particularly in complex litigation 
with asymmetric discovery obligations22 involving large amounts of 
electronically stored information. Since 1999, there have been at least 
forty reported cases in which sampling has been considered or utilized.23 
This Article provides both an empirical and normative study of 
those cases, and of contemporary sampling practice generally. We find 
increasing acceptance and use of the practice, but also a wide variety of 
different approaches and conflicting methodologies. Courts have 
differed over when it is appropriate to use sampling techniques, the size 
of the sample to be used, the method by which the sample is to be 
selected, whether sampling should be used to cut-off further discovery 
or merely to shift costs, and many other issues. The Federal Rules 
provide no guidance on any of these matters and the discussion of these 
issues in the cases themselves is limited. 
In order to identify issues where sampling practice is inconsistent 
or where additional guidance appears to be required, this Article 
provides the first comprehensive overview and statistical analysis of the 
practice. Our aim is to provide a coherent theoretical approach to the 
use of sampling, suggesting “best practices” for many unresolved issues 
and locating sampling practice within broader contemporary debates 
about discovery. We view sampling as a creative judicial response to the 
task created for the courts by the substitution of “proportionality” for 
“full disclosure” as the governing standard for discovery in 
contemporary civil litigation. 
We believe sampling provides useful “discovery about discovery.” 
By giving a court additional information about the data or documents 
being sought, sampling enables a court to make a better informed and 
more nuanced decision on the underlying discovery dispute. By 
requiring the court to rule coherently on such concepts as the “likely 
benefit”24 of the proposed discovery or the “needs of the case,”25 the 
proportionality standard requires the court to develop a much finer-
grained understanding of the merits of the underlying litigation during 
the pretrial process. We believe properly conducted sampling can aid 
 
 21 229 F.R.D. 422 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (Zubulake V). This case resulted in numerous written 
opinions, several of which will be referenced in this Article, according to their canonical 
desigantions. See id. at 424 (“This is the fifth written opinion in this case, a relatively routine 
employment discrimination dispute in which discovery has now lasted over two years.”); see 
also, e.g., Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake I), 217 F.R.D. 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); 
Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake III), 216 F.R.D. 280 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
 22 See discussion infra Part I.B; see also Rodney A. Satterwhite & Matthew J. Quatrara, 
Asymmetrical Warfare: The Cost of Electronic Discovery in Employment Litigation, 14 RICH. J.L. 
& TECH. 9 (2008). 
 23  See infra Part II.A. 
 24 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii). 
 25 Id. 
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the court in its development of such an understanding, and should be 
applied in a fair, neutral, and cost-effective way, while recognizing that 
some prejudgment of the merits is a necessary consequence of the 
application of the proportionality standard. 
This Article is divided into three parts. Part I is a conceptual 
overview that considers (a) the recent changes in discovery practice 
under the Federal Rules and the rise of proportionality as the governing 
standard, (b) the origins of sampling and the current legal rules 
governing it, and (c) a normative justification of sampling practice in 
enabling courts to apply the proportionality standard more fairly and 
effectively. Part II is an empirical study of the reported sampling cases, 
using both descriptive and statistical approaches to analyze the case law. 
It reviews in what contexts courts utilize sampling, the disparate 
approaches courts have taken in employing the sampling methodology, 
and the effect sampling has on the decision to shift costs or cut-off 
discovery. Part III seeks to apply the theoretical perspective of Part I to 
the practical questions revealed in Part II, with the goal of providing a 
new, relatively comprehensive account of “best practices” regarding 
when and how sampling techniques should be utilized. 
We derive from this analysis some new and perhaps surprising 
conclusions. We discover from the existing case law a fairly strict upper 
limit on sampling of 25% of the total cost of the discovery sought. We 
believe that a presumptive sample size of between 15% and 25% is likely 
to provide maximum information to courts at minimum cost in most 
cases. We were also somewhat surprised to find that most courts do not 
follow a randomized method of “scientific sampling” but more 
frequently follow versions of a “best case scenario” approach in which 
the party seeking discovery gets to choose which files will be sampled. 
Although this approach has been implicitly criticized by some 
commentators who espouse scientific sampling, we believe it can, in 
fact, be justified in many cases as the optimal sampling methodology. 
Finally, although we find the courts have sharply split over whether 
sampling should be used to cut-off discovery or merely shift costs, we 
provide a normative rule under which both results can be justified in 
different circumstances based on the information provided by sampling. 
I.     THE ROLE OF SAMPLING IN CONTEMPORARY DISCOVERY PRACTICE 
A.     The Rise and Decline of Full Disclosure 
Discovery is not what it used to be. The drafters of the Federal 
Rules, who created modern federal discovery practice,26 were motivated 
 
 26 For discussion of the “revolutionary” change represented by the discovery provisions of 
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by a vision of “full disclosure” aimed at eliminating surprises at trial27 
and ensuring that adjudication would be based on the fullest possible 
evidentiary record.28 Mutual self-interest would cause the parties to 
exchange relevant information about the critical factual allegations of 
the case in what would be a largely self-regulating process.29 This would 
lead to fairer, more efficient, and shorter trials, as well as more and 
better settlements.30 
This vision has long since ceased to be the dominant view of how 
federal civil discovery should be conducted.31 Having reached an apex of 
sorts with the 1970 revision to the Federal Rules, the ideal of full 
disclosure has been in retreat ever since. Concerns about over-discovery, 
“fishing expeditions,” imposition of massive costs, and other alleged 
abuses of the discovery process by those claiming a right to “full 
disclosure” emerged shortly after 197032 and have led to repeated 
modifications and limitations of the discovery rules.33 The trend of these 
changes has been to grant judges greater power to limit parties’ access to 
information in the possession of their opponents. The standard of 
“proportionality” has been superimposed over the ideal of full 
 
the original Federal Rules, see Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Discovery Vices and Trans-Substantive 
Virtues in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2237, 2238–39 (1989); 
Stephen N. Subrin, Fishing Expeditions Allowed: The Historical Background of the 1938 Federal 
Discovery Rules, 39 B.C. L. REV. 691, 734 (1998). 
 27 See Edson R. Sunderland, Foreword to GEORGE RAGLAND, JR., DISCOVERY BEFORE TRIAL, 
at iii (1932): 
False and fictitious causes and defenses thrive under a system of concealment and 
secrecy in the preliminary stages of litigation followed by surprise and confusion at 
the trial. Under such a system the merits of controversies are imperfectly understood 
by the parties, are inadequately presented to the courts, and too often fail to exert a 
controlling influence upon the final judgment. 
Id. 
 28 After the 1970 revisions, a simple request was sufficient. Prior to that time, the party 
seeking relevant information had to show “good cause,” a standard to which the current rules 
have partially returned. John H. Beisner, Discovering a Better Way: The Need for Effective Civil 
Litigation Reform, 60 DUKE L.J. 547, 560–61 (2010). 
 29 Id. at 557. 
 30 STEPHEN N. SUBRIN & MARGARET Y. K. WOO, LITIGATING IN AMERICA: CIVIL 
PROCEDURE IN CONTEXT 144 (2006); see also Subrin, supra note 26, at 716. 
 31 Yet how well the current system is functioning remains a matter of considerable dispute. 
See EMERY G. LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., NATIONAL, CASE-BASED 
CIVIL RULES SURVEY 27 (2009), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/dissurv1.
pdf/$file/dissurv1.pdf (“Respondents were asked to rate the information generated by the 
parties in discovery in the closed case. . . . Both plaintiff and defendant attorneys tended to 
answer ‘just the right amount;’ 56.6 and 66.8 percent, respectively, gave that answer.”). 
 32 See, e.g., Richard Marcus, Retooling American Discovery for the Twenty-First Century: 
Toward a New World Order?, 7 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 153, 155 (1999); Edward F. Sherman & 
Stephen O. Kinnard, Federal Court Discovery in the 80’s—Making the Rules Work, 95 F.R.D. 
245, 246 (1982); Jeffrey W. Stempel & David F. Herr, Applying Amended Rule 26(B)(1) in 
Litigation: The New Scope of Discovery, 199 F.R.D. 396, 401–02 (2001).  
 33 Since their promulgation, the discovery rules have been amended twelve times: in 1946, 
1963, 1966, 1970, 1980, 1983, 1987, 1993, 2000, 2006, 2007, and 2010. FED. R. CIV. P. 26. 
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disclosure.34 The right to relevant information must be weighed against 
the stakes in the litigation, the costs of obtaining it, and the benefit it is 
likely to provide to the party seeking it. These concerns are exacerbated 
when the information sought is not in “reasonably accessible” electronic 
form.35 
These changes to discovery rules reflected a series of broader 
technological, social, and legal changes. The first has been an immense 
increase in the amount of potentially discoverable information. In 1970, 
duplicating machines were just beginning to be common office 
equipment, making every copy with some handwritten notes in the 
margin a “non-identical copy” which had to be separately searched for 
and disclosed.36 Fax machines and electronic data storage also expanded 
the universe of discoverable data. The biggest change, however, has been 
the advent of e-mail. Conversations that once would have occurred over 
the telephone or at the water cooler—and would have therefore 
vanished without a trace—are now being preserved and retained, 
perhaps indefinitely, in the data storage of the company. 
An equally important legal development has been an enormous 
increase in “asymmetric litigation”—cases in which one side possesses 
almost all the relevant information. As Judge Richard Posner recently 
observed, in a class action he dubbed “nearly frivolous”: 
In most class action suits, including this one, there is far more 
evidence that plaintiffs may be able to discover in defendants’ records 
(including emails, the vast and ever-expanding volume of which has 
made the cost of discovery soar) than vice versa. For usually the 
defendant’ conduct is the focus of the litigation and it is in their 
records, generally much more extensive than the plaintiffs’ 
(especially when as in a consumer class action the plaintiffs are 
individuals rather than corporations or other institutions), that the 
plaintiffs will want to rummage in quest of smoking guns.37 
This change in the conception of “typical” litigation from one in 
which each side has relevant information to one in which discovery is a 
weapon to be wielded by one party against the other underlies much of 
the effort to roll back the scope of discovery under the Federal Rules.38 
 
 34 This standard of “proportionality” was codified in FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii). 
 35 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B). 
 36 See Metro. Opera Ass’n v. Local 100, Hotel Emps. & Rest. Emps. Int’l Union, 212 F.R.D. 
178, 181 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (explaining that drafts, non-identical copies, and electronic copies all 
must be disclosed). 
 37 Thorogood v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 624 F.3d 842, 849–50 (7th Cir. 2010), cert. granted 
and judgment vacated, 131 S. Ct. 3060 (2011) (mem.). The growth of personal computers with 
their own difficult-to-completely-erase cache of discoverable e-mails belonging to plaintiffs 
may someday restore some reciprocity and “two-sidedness” to the discovery process, but that 
day still seems far off. 
 38 It is worth remembering that a private right to sue for federal securities law violations 
was only clearly established in 1964, see J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964), which 
happens to be the same year Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 
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Closely connected to the development of these new kinds of claims 
(and the rise of a specialized group of plaintiffs’ counsel to prosecute 
them) is a third, subtler, and perhaps more controversial change in the 
concept of what constitutes relevant information. Whereas traditional 
litigation turned largely on development and exposition of concrete 
facts about the actions of the parties and the events giving rise to the 
claims, a critical question in much of the new asymmetric litigation 
against corporations turns on the knowledge or beliefs of the 
companies’ agents. So the question of whether a company knew a 
statement in its securities filing had become untrue, or had notice of the 
dangers or addictive nature of their product, or fired a worker with 
discriminatory intent, are all matters in which the difference between 
winning and losing the case would appear to be the contents of e-mails 
and other documents found in the companies files.39 In such cases, 
access to broad ranging discovery will seem critical to plaintiffs yet may 
appear to defense counsel as an unguided “fishing expedition.” 
These changes have made it substantially more difficult to realize 
the original drafters’ vision of discovery as a self-regulating cooperative 
process.40 When certain parties, and the lawyers who represent them, 
know that they will consistently be either requesting or resisting 
discovery, they have an incentive to take maximalist positions with 
respect to such disputes. To be sure, professional ethics and the 
discovery rules place some limits on the extremity of positions lawyers 
 
Stat. 253 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-14 (2006)), the basis for most 
employment discrimination class actions, was passed. Most consumer class actions came even 
later, and many products liability claims, although still not able to be brought as class actions, 
are large complex lawsuits where discovery is strongly asymmetric. See John Cirace, A Theory of 
Negligence and Products Liability, 66 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1, 63–64 (1992); Satterwhite, supra note 
22, at 6–9 (discussing asymmetrical litigation in the employment discrimination context); 
Wendy E. Wagner, What’s It All About, Cardozo?, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1577, 1592–93 (2002). 
 39 Consider the following statement from the website of an electronic data discovery 
support firm, which adopts such a perspective in an ad aimed at plaintiffs’ counsel: 
Every litigation team is looking for it. The “smoking gun.” You know where it is—it’s 
in that forest of paper that opposing counsel has—and you’ve got to find it. But what 
if the “gun” isn’t paper, and never was? What if there is no forest? It may just be 
made up of bytes, zeroes and ones that mean something electronically. Today, more 
than 93 percent of documents generated are originally created in an electronic 
format. . . . As such, a traditional discovery demand will not capture this electronic 
information if you don’t specifically ask for it. . . . The scariest prospect is the sheer 
amount of data created, and it is nothing short of infinite. In 2008, internet users 
alone, will generate just over one hundred sixty-one (161) exabytes of data (an 
exabyte is a billion gigabytes). The average American can have more than a gigabyte 
of just e-mail on his or her hard drive, any one of which may be highly relevant to 
your case. 
Robert Almoney, Smoking Guns: Electronic Intentions, Data and Discovery Costs, LEGALIS, 
http://www.legalis.com/WhitePapers-SmokingGuns (last visited Oct. 20, 2011). 
 40 John S. Beckerman, Confronting Civil Discovery’s Fatal Flaws, 84 MINN. L. REV. 505, 515–
16 (2000); Steven S. Gensler, Some Thoughts on the Lawyer’s E-volving Duties in Discovery, 36 
N. KY. L. REV. 521, 530, 540 (2009).  
728 C A R D O ZO  L AW  R E V I E W  [Vol. 34:719 
can responsibly take, and lawyers may feel a responsibility to honor the 
various calls for cooperation in discovery made implicitly in the 
discovery rules and explicitly by critics of the existing system.41 The fact 
remains, however, that lawyers engaged primarily in asymmetric 
litigation tend to view discovery disputes from a narrower perspective 
than those who are familiar with both sides of such disputes.42 This 
tendency toward polarization has extended beyond litigation to law 
reform efforts as well.43 
In light of powerful calls for either radical change or no change at 
all, the gradual development of a complex and nuanced rule that seeks 
to accommodate both of these perspectives must be judged a single 
achievement of the rulemaking process. The product of that process, the 
“proportionality” standard, has now become the prevailing legal 
criterion for resolving discovery disputes.44 While the basic scope of 
 
 41 See The Sedona Conference, The Sedona Conference Cooperation Proclamation, 10 
SEDONA CONF. J. 331, 331 (2009). 
 42 See, e.g., Thomas E. Willging et al., An Empirical Study of Discovery and Disclosure 
Practice Under the 1993 Federal Rule Amendments, 39 B.C. L. REV. 525, 540 (1998) (finding that 
plaintiff attorneys were more likely to complain that a party failed to respond adequately, while 
defense attorneys lamented the vagueness of requests or number of documents sought). But see 
James S. Kakalik et al., Discovery Management: Further Analysis of the Civil Justice Reform Act 
Evaluation Data, 39 B.C. L. REV. 613, 638 (1998) (finding no statistical difference in the 
percentage of lawyers who viewed the management of discovery as fair). 
 43 Groups that see themselves as primarily representing corporate interests have been a 
strong voice for greater restrictions on discovery, while those who represent plaintiffs’ interests 
point to the negative impact of such changes. See JOHN H. BEISNER, U.S. CHAMBER OF 
COMMERCE INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, THE CENTRE CANNOT HOLD: THE NEED FOR EFFECTIVE 
REFORM OF THE U.S. CIVIL DISCOVERY PROCESS, 18–19 (2010) (“[C]orporations . . . now list 
discovery as their most pressing concern when litigation is imminent.”); Joshua M. Koppel, 
Tailoring Discovery: Using Nontranssubstantive Rules to Reduce Waste and Abuse, 161 U. PA. L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
2154468 (manuscript at 20) (“Some scholars and practitioners, mostly defendants’ 
organizations, argue that parties are able to use the broad tools of discovery to impose costs on 
their adversaries that push the adversary toward settlement.”). On the other hand, plaintiffs’ 
attorneys feel the need to use “the discovery rules in a way that either brings relevant 
information to light, or assures that a party that suppresses information bears the 
consequences.” Stuart Ollanik, Wielding the Tools of Discovery, AMERICAN ASS’N FOR JUSTICE, 
Fall 2007, at 8 (listing various methods to best use the discovery process to the plaintiff’s 
benefit). 
 44 See 8 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, MARY KAY KANE & RICHARD L. 
MARCUS, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2008.1 (3d ed. 2010). “[W]hen the second 
edition of [Federal Practice and Procedure] appeared in 1994, it seemed that the Rule 26 
proportionality provision had . . . produced only a ripple in the caselaw” and some courts 
continued to address discovery issues “without invoking the new language.” Id. Since then, 
however, “attention to the proportionality provisions has grown . . . and endorsement of their 
use has widened.” Id.; see also Ronald J. Hedges, A View from the Bench and the Trenches: A 
Critical Appraisal of Some Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 227 
F.R.D. 123, 126–27 (2005); Richard L. Marcus, Discovery Containment Redux, 39 B.C. L. REV. 
747, 773 (1998); Richard L. Marcus, Retooling American Discovery for the Twenty-First Century: 
Toward a New World Order?, 7 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 153, 162–63 (1999); Shira A. 
Scheindlin & Jeffrey Rabkin, Electronic Discovery in Federal Civil Litigation: Is Rule 34 Up to the 
Task?, 41 B.C. L. REV. 327, 349 (2000); Panel Discussion, Managing Electronic Discovery: Views 
from the Judges, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 24 (2007). However, “attention to the proportionality 
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disclosure under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1) remains 
almost as broad as it was in 1970, Rule 26(b)(2)(C) instructs federal 
judges that they “must limit” the frequency or extent of otherwise 
permitted discovery if they determine that (i) it is unreasonably 
cumulative or may be obtained from a less burdensome, more 
convenient source; (ii) the party has already had “ample opportunity” to 
obtain the information sought; and (iii) it prescribes an explicit 
balancing test in which the “burden and expense of the proposed 
discovery” is weighed against its “likely benefit, considering the needs of 
the case, the amount in controversy, the parties’ resources, the 
importance of the issues at stake in the action, and the importance of the 
discovery in resolving the issues.”45 
Those same considerations are referenced in Rule 26(b)(2)(B), a 
more recent limitation on discovery enacted as part of the December 1, 
2006 e-discovery amendments to the Federal Rules.46 Rule 26(b)(2)(B) 
requires the responding party to show that the electronically stored 
information requested is “not reasonably accessible because of undue 
burden or cost.”47 Such information may still be obtained, but only 
upon a showing of “good cause” by the requesting party, and good cause 
is expressly made subject to the proportionality considerations of Rule 
26(b)(2)(C).48 
The strength of the proportionality standard is that it is able to 
maintain the rules drafters’ fundamental vision of wide-ranging 
discovery, the costs of which are borne primarily by the producing 
party, while recognizing that such a vision is subject to abuse and must 
be carefully supervised to avoid becoming a device for unnecessarily 
burdening or coercing the party against whom discovery is sought. The 
proportionality standard guards against such abuses, however, not by 
restricting the scope or availability of discovery at the outset, but by 
subjecting potentially burdensome requests to a searching, 
individualized analysis of their costs and benefits in the particular 
litigation within which they are made. The problem is that this approach 
requires that complex and searching analysis from a neutral decision-
maker, i.e., a judge or magistrate judge, who must develop a clear and 
 
provisions has grown since 1994, and endorsement of their use has widened.” WRIGHT ET AL., 
supra § 2008.1. 
 45 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(i)–(iii). 
 46 Supreme Court of the United States, Order Adopting Amendments to the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure ¶ 3 (Apr. 12, 2006), available at http:// www.supremecourt.gov/orders/
courtorders/frcv06p.pdf. 
 47 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B). 
 48 “Good cause” is to be determined by “considering the limitations of Rule 26(b)(2)(C).” 
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B). Some commentators have argued that an exact “good cause” test 
remains elusive. See Rachel Hytken, Electronic Discovery: To What Extent Do the 2006 
Amendments Satisfy Their Purposes?, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 875, 890–91 (2008); Henry S. 
Noyes, Good Cause Is Bad Medicine for the New E-Discovery Rules, 21 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 49, 
87–91 (2007). 
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coherent perspective on the case whose pretrial process is being 
supervised. 
Consider how the proportionality standard plays out in the kind of 
asymmetric discovery cases previously described. Although the 
balancing test of Rule 26(b)(2)(B)(iii)49 is stated as a neutral principle, it 
is clear that in the vast majority of cases, absent cost-shifting, the 
“burden and expense” of discovery is going to fall on the party against 
whom discovery is sought, the corporate defendant, while most, if not 
all of the “likely benefit” of the discovery is likely to inure to plaintiffs by 
helping them prove their case. Of the various “considerations” 
mentioned by the Rule, only two—the amount in controversy and the 
parties’ resources—are likely to be relatively objectively ascertainable by 
the court without regard to merits-based considerations. Those 
considerations are likely to provide clear answers to only a small portion 
of discovery disputes. When the amount in controversy and defendants’ 
resources are both substantial, however, and the proposed discovery, 
while expensive, is still only a small fraction of those amounts, then Rule 
26(b)(2)(B)(iii) directs consideration of “the needs of the case,” “the 
importance of the issues at stake in the litigation,” and the “importance 
of the proposed discovery in resolving the issue.”50 It is likely that the 
plaintiffs seeking discovery and the defendants resisting it will have very 
different views on these matters, differences rooted in their distinct 
views of the underlying merits of plaintiffs’ claims. Judges may be 
understandably reluctant or unable to resolve these merits-based 
disputes before ruling on the pending discovery issues. 
The Advisory Committee notes to the 2006 amendments recognize 
this dilemma and explicitly authorize sampling as a way to deal with it. 
In describing the “good cause” determination of Rule 26(b)(2)(B), 
which expressly references the “limitations of Rule 26(b)(2)(C),” the 
Committee states: 
 
 49 The Advisory Committee notes produced a five-factor balancing test in connection with 
its promulgation of Rule 26(b)(2)(B), and various other tests can be derived from the cases 
predating the 2006 amendments. For a comparative analysis of such tests, see Robert E. Altman 
& Benjamin Lewis, Note, Cost-shifting in ESI Discovery Disputes: A Five Factor Test to Promote 
Consistency and Set Party Expectations, 36 N. KY. L. REV. 569, 587–92 (2009). Such tests include 
the “marginal utility” test articulated in McPeek v. Ashcroft, 202 F.R.D. 31, 34 (D.D.C. 2001), 
the Rowe eight-factor test set forth in Rowe Entertainment, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 
205 F.R.D. 421, 428–31 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), the Zubulake factors, see Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. 309, 
321–22 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), and a modification to the Zubulake test in Wiginton v. CB Richard 
Ellis, Inc., 229 F.R.D. 568, 572–73 (N.D. Ill. 2004). The ABA has also advocated its own sixteen-
factor balancing test. See SECTION OF LITIG., AM. BAR ASS’N, CIVIL DISCOVERY STANDARDS, 
Standard 29(b)(iv)(A-P) (2004). We are skeptical as to whether these various tests make much 
difference to judges actually engaged in the application of the proportionality standard and 
agree with Judge Scheindlin, who has stated, albeit in different terms, that the most important 
considerations under any of these standards is the simple “marginal utility” test: whether the 
likely value of the requested information outweighs the likely burden and cost of producing it. 
See Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 323. 
 50 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B)(iii). 
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The good-cause determination, however, may be complicated 
because the court and parties may know little about what 
information the sources identified as not reasonably accessible might 
contain, whether it is relevant, or how valuable it may be to the 
litigation. In such cases, the parties may need some focused 
discovery, which may include sampling of the sources, to learn more 
about what burdens and costs are involved in accessing the 
information, what the information consists of, and how valuable it is 
for the litigation in light of information that can be obtained by 
exhausting other opportunities for discovery.51 
The Advisory Committee makes a significant distinction about the 
information that may be obtained by sampling. It may tell the court not 
just whether the requested discovery is “relevant,” but more 
importantly, “how valuable it is for the litigation.” Implicit in this 
distinction is recognition that not all relevant information is equally 
valuable, or equally subject to discovery. Indeed, under modern 
concepts of relevance and the broader readings of the Rule 26(b)(2) 
standard, even the absence of information in defendants’ files may have 
some “relevance” to the disputed claims. The proportionality test, 
however, presumes that relevance is not a binary property, but one that, 
like the cost and burden against which it is measured, can come in 
different degrees. When Rule 26(b)(2)(C)(iii) requires an evaluation of 
the “likely benefit” of the discovery and its “importance in resolving the 
issues,” it is asking a court to determine not merely the relevance of the 
information sought, but its value to the litigation as a whole. This 
requires a fuller, more probing inquiry into the nature of the 
information being sought, information that frequently can only be 
provided in a cost-effective way by sampling. 
There remains, however, the question of weight. Even when it is 
shown that the requested discovery is likely to contain not just relevant 
but “valuable” or “important” information, can it be outweighed by the 
countervailing considerations of burden and expense? The appropriate 
weighting of these various considerations is not specified under the 
Rule. Are a plaintiff’s need and a defendant’s burden equal 
considerations, or does a substantial showing of need by a plaintiff 
prevail against an equally substantial showing of burden by a defendant? 
Here we think it is important to recognize that the principle of 
proportionality is not a replacement for the principle of full disclosure, 
but an amendment and limitation on that principle, which continues to 
be the basic philosophy of the federal discovery rules. The point is well 
made by Professor Richard Marcus: 
Overall, [post-1970 rule changes providing for proportionality review 
and other limitations on federal discovery] represent[] a significant 
 
 51 FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note, 2006 amend. 
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retrenchment from the broadest views of discovery that emerged in 
the 1960s. At the same time, it is important to appreciate that there 
was no renunciation of the basic idea of broad discovery, or the 
general notion that the responding party cannot force the other side 
to pay the cost of discovery.52 
The clear implication of this view is that when files are likely to 
contain information that is valuable and important in proving the 
plaintiff’s case, discovery of such information will be ordered, and at 
defendant’s expense.53 But how is a judge supposed to make a 
determination when the contents of defendants’ files remain unknown, 
not just to the court and the plaintiffs, but very possibly to the 
defendants as well? It is in such circumstances that sampling may 
provide critical information to the court. 
B.     The Origins and Current Law of Sampling 
Although sampling has mostly occurred in the federal courts,54 the 
first reported discussion of sampling came from a Massachusetts state 
court, Linnen v. A.H. Robins Co.55 It was one of numerous product 
liability suits filed following the detection of a link between the 
commonly prescribed appetite suppressant “fen-phen” and valvular 
 
 52 Richard Marcus, Essay, Only Yesterday: Reflections on Rulemaking Responses to E-
Discovery, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 7 (2004). Professor Marcus is Special Reporter to the 
Discovery Subcommittee of the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, 1996–
present. In this Essay, Professor Marcus also noted that the e-discovery amendments were 
designed to preserve the same balance as prior rule changes between the wide availability of 
broad discovery and the power of the courts to curb abuses. Id. at 13–14. 
 53 This is also consistent with Judge Scheindlin’s weighting of the relevant cost-shifting 
factors in Zubulake III, though she warns the “list of factors is not merely a matter of counting 
and adding; it is only a guide.” 216 F.R.D. 280, 289 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). The first two factors, “(1) 
the extent to which the request is specifically tailored to discover relevant information;” and 
“(2) the availability of such information from other sources . . . comprise the ‘marginal utility 
test’” and “should be weighted the most heavily in the cost-shifting analysis.” Id. at 284. Factors 
three, four, and five “address[] cost issues.” Id. at 287. Noting that “[i]n an ordinary case, a 
responding party should not be required to pay for the restoration of inaccessible data if the 
cost of that restoration is significantly disproportionate to the value of the case,” Judge 
Scheindlin found these factors to weigh against cost-shifting in Zubulake, because of the case’s 
potential value. Id. at 288. Judge Scheindlin stated that factor six will often be “neutral” because 
litigation rarely presents a “novel issue.” Id. at 288–89. Finally, factor seven, was found to 
“weigh[] in favor of cost-shifting” because the defendant “would not restore any of th[e] data of 
its own volition.” Id. at 289. 
 54 In the course of our research, we only came across seven cases in which a state court used 
or considered the use of a sampling technique in the electronic discovery context. Of course, 
since most state trial court decisions, as well as those of many federal district courts, are never 
published (and that is likely to be particularly true with respect to decisions on discovery 
disputes), there may be considerably more court decisions concerning sampling that are simply 
unavailable for review. 
 55 No. 97-2307, 1999 WL 462015, at *5–7 (Mass. Super. Ct. June 16, 1999). 
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heart disease.56 In Linnen, the plaintiffs sought production of e-mail 
messages retained by one of the defendants, Wyeth-Ayerst Laboratories 
(Wyeth). Wyeth opposed this request as duplicative,57 costly, and 
burdensome.58 
The plaintiffs’ management committee reached an agreement with 
Wyeth whereby Wyeth would restore a sample of the backup tapes.59 
Wyeth had agreed to bear the initial costs of restoring the sample, but 
had the right to seek reimbursement.60 This agreement was reported to 
the Massachusetts Superior Court, which approved it, stating that the 
“tapes have the potential for containing relevant material and that 
plaintiffs should have the opportunity to examine at least a portion of 
the tapes to determine if that is the case.”61 The Linnen case contains no 
discussion of the techniques to be used in determining the sample or 
how the parties came up with the sampling technique in the first place. 
The first federal opinion discussing the use of sampling was 
McPeek v. Ashcroft.62 Steven McPeek, an employee in the Bureau of 
Prisons, claimed he was sexually harassed by his then-supervisor and 
was subsequently retaliated against for filing harassment claims.63 After 
the Department of Justice produced paper and electronic documents, 
McPeek requested a search of the Department’s backup system since it 
might yield data deleted by computer users.64 The Department protested 
that the possibility of relevant evidence from such a search was remote 
and could not justify the cost.65 
 
 56 See In re Diet Drugs, 582 F.3d 524, 529 (3d Cir. 2009). 
 57 Some of the earliest “fen-phen” litigation took place in Texas state courts. Those lawsuits 
generated expansive discovery; for example, Wyeth produced approximately three million 
pages of documents. Id. at 529–30. 
 58 Linnen, 1999 WL 462015, at *1. Wyeth maintained a software system that backed up 
intra-office communications on a daily basis. Those backup tapes also contained word 
processing files, spreadsheets, models, and e-mails saved on Wyeth’s computers. The tapes were 
intended to be used only for data recovery in the event of a catastrophic disaster, and therefore 
were only kept for three months and then recycled. In 1997, Wyeth suspended its usual 
recycling practices and saved all backup tapes. A year later, Wyeth discovered a number of 
backup tapes from January 1994 to May 1995 that had been saved during the pendency of 
unrelated litigation. It was those tapes that were the subject of the plaintiffs’ motion to compel. 
Id. The court estimated that 746 backup tapes could potentially contain relevant information, 
and estimates of the cost of restoring those tapes ranged from $1.15 to $1.75 million. Id. at *4. 
The plaintiffs in the multi-district litigation sought the same backup tapes. Id. 
 59 Id. at *5. 
 60 Id. Further discovery beyond that sample would be allowed only upon a showing of 
“good cause.” 
 61 Id. at *6. The court reserved “any decision to require additional tapes to be restored until 
the potential for relevant and responsive documents has been more fully explored through 
review of the restored sample tapes.” Id. 
 62 202 F.R.D. 31 (D.D.C. 2001). 
 63 Id. at 31–32. 
 64 Id. at 32. 
 65 Id. The Department’s backup system was designed to permit recovery from a disaster, 
not archival preservation, and accordingly there were backup tapes for some periods but not 
others. Id. 
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Faced with the conflict between the “theoretical possibility” that a 
smoking gun might be hidden in the government’s backup tapes, and 
the very real cost of restoring those tapes in monetary terms and human 
hours, the court elected to “take small steps and perform, as it were, a 
test run.”66 Magistrate Judge Francis Facciola set the parameters of this 
“test run”: the defendant would perform a backup tape restoration of the 
e-mails attributable to a period selected by the court, based on its 
understanding of when the allegedly wrongful conduct was most likely 
to have occurred.67 The defendant was to document the time and money 
spent doing the search, and upon completing the search the court would 
balance the search results against the expenses to determine whether 
additional discovery should go forward.68 
Two years later, Judge Scheindlin fleshed out the sampling 
approach in her seminal Zubulake opinions.69 Zubulake was an action 
by a former employee against her employer for retaliation and gender 
discrimination.70 In response to Zubulake’s discovery requests, UBS 
produced approximately 350 pages of documents, including 
approximately 100 pages of e-mails.71 UBS, however, never searched for 
responsive e-mails on its backup tapes because it told plaintiff the cost 
of producing e-mails would be prohibitive (estimated at approximately 
$300,000).72 UBS further argued that the cost of any discovery of the 
backup tapes should be shifted to Zubulake given the professed low 
probability that such a search would produce evidence worth the cost 
involved.73 
After setting out a multi-factor test for cost-shifting, Judge 
Scheindlin expressed concern that courts applying cost-shifting analyses 
frequently made assumptions about the likelihood of finding relevant 
information without any factual basis.74 This fact-less approach to cost-
shifting was problematic for Judge Scheindlin because it is arguably 
inconsistent with Rule 26(b)(1)’s liberal approach to discovery, and 
 
 66 Id. at 33–34. 
 67 Id. at 34–35. 
 68 Id. at 35. 
 69 Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 322–23. 
 70 Id. at 312. 
 71 Id. at 312–13. 
 72 Id. at 313. UBS later informed the court that the cost of restoring those e-mails on the 
backup tapes alone would cost approximately $175,000.00, exclusive of attorney time for 
reviewing the e-mails. Zubulake sought damages of approximately $13 million. Id. at 311 n.9, 
311–12. 
 73 Id. at 313–14, 16. 
 74 Judge Scheindlin provided two examples of this approach: In Rowe Entertainment, Inc. v. 
William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421, 430 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), the court relied on the lack of 
witness testimony or documentary evidence “showing that the e-mails are likely to be a gold 
mine” to find in favor of cost-shifting. Similarly in Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. Fluor Daniel, Inc., 
No. 99-3564, 2002 WL 246439, at *5 (E.D. La. Feb. 19, 2002), the court ordered cost-shifting 
because “the marginal value of searching the e-mail is modest at best” and the plaintiff “has not 
pointed to any evidence that shows that ‘the e-mails are likely to be a gold mine.’” 
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because as a practical matter it is rare that a plaintiff will have sufficient 
evidence before conducting discovery to demonstrate the necessity of 
specific discovery. Judge Scheindlin ordered limited sampling of the 
backup tapes in question in order to inform the cost-shifting analysis 
with factual evidence gleaned through the sampling. In her words: 
When based on an actual sample, the marginal utility test will not be 
an exercise in speculation—there will be tangible evidence of what 
the backup tapes may have to offer. There will also be tangible 
evidence of the time and cost required to restore the backup tapes, 
which in turn will inform the second group of cost-shifting factors. 
Thus, by requiring a sample restoration of backup tapes, the entire 
cost-shifting analysis can be grounded in fact rather than 
guesswork.75 
Judge Scheindlin’s opinion in Zubulake has since had an enormous 
influence not only on the use of sampling,76 but also on cost-shifting in 
electronic discovery generally.77 
We can see from these decisions that sampling developed as an 
attempt to apply proportionality analysis to the costs of restoring and 
searching backup tapes in situations involving asymmetric litigation. In 
each case the courts were faced with balancing the high costs of the 
requested production against substantial uncertainty regarding the 
importance of the requested information. The courts in each case also 
sought to reduce that uncertainty by informing themselves, through 
sampling, about the likely contents of the requested information as well 
as the actual costs of discovery.78 Further, in each of the cases the court 
was not just concerned with whether the potential information was 
relevant, but whether it was so important that it constituted a “smoking 
gun”79 or “gold mine”80 sufficient to outweigh the cost of production. 
In light of the foregoing developments, and the recognition of the 
sampling approach in the Advisory Committee notes to the 2006 e-
 
 75 Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 324. 
 76 A number of decisions have relied on Zubulake as precedent for the use of sampling. See, 
e.g., Parkdale Am., LLC v. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am., Inc., Civil No. 3:06CV78-R, 2007 
WL 4165247, at *12–13 (W.D.N.C. Nov. 19, 2007); Quinby v. WestLB AG, 245 F.R.D. 94, 102 
(S.D.N.Y. 2006); Hagemeyer N. Am., Inc. v. Gateway Data Scis. Corp., 222 F.R.D. 594, 602 
(E.D. Wis. 2004). 
 77 See James M. Evangelista, Polishing the “Gold Standard” on the E-Discovery Cost-Shifting 
Analysis: Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, LLC, 9 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 1, 3 (2004) (“[T]he Zubulake 
decisions will become the seminal reference on this issue.”); Christopher L. Troy & Margaret K. 
Simpson, “Electrifying” Changes to the Federal Discovery Rules, 36 SPG BRIEF 32, 34 (2007) 
(“The multiple opinions of Zubulake v. UBS Warburg have received the most attention and 
have become touchstones for resolving electronic discovery disputes.”). 
 78 Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 312; McPeek v. Ashcroft, 202 F.R.D. 31, 34 (D.D.C. 2001); see 
also supra note 72. 
 79 Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 311 n.8. 
 80 Id. at 323. 
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discovery amendments,81 the “concept of sampling to test both the cost 
and the yield is now part of the mainstream approach to electronic 
discovery.”82 While sampling has made its way into the judicial toolbox 
for handling electronic discovery disputes, the ways in which sampling 
has been implemented have been inconsistent across courts, and there 
has been no attempt to explain how sampling fits into the ongoing 
debates about managerial judging and discovery abuse. That is the task 
of the next Section. 
C.     A Normative Justification for Sampling 
Sampling is not a completely unprecedented departure from prior 
discovery practice. Rather, it is a logical extension of the trend toward 
“managerial judging”—the reconceptualization of the judicial role from 
that of a passive, disinterested umpire to that of an active participant 
exercising various forms of discretionary adjudicative power over the 
pretrial process. The move to managerial judging has been 
controversial, particularly among academics who fear that by 
emphasizing matters of efficiency and cost reduction important process 
values may be lost.83 
Sampling is uniquely interesting in this context, because although 
it is a tool of managerial judging in that it helps judges resolve complex 
discovery disputes in a cost-efficient manner, it does so by providing the 
judge with new information about the merits of the dispute. A judge 
who grants a motion to compel after reviewing a sample of the 
requested discovery, and determining that its “importance to the case” 
outweighs its cost, is making a merits-based determination, not one 
based solely on cost or efficiency concerns.84 As such, sampling 
responds to some of the concerns of critics of the managerial judging 
model, who fear that pretrial management is only about reducing costs 
and settling issues, with little consideration for the merits of the 
individual case.85 Sampling allows judges to inquire more fully into the 
 
 81 See discussion supra Part I.A, concerning the specific reference to sampling in the 
Committee Notes to the 2006 e-discovery amendments. Notably, Judge Scheindlin was a 
member of the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Civil Rules from 1998–2005, and 
served on the Discovery Subcommittee when the 2006 amendments were drafted. 
 82 Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Collins & Aikman Corp., 256 F.R.D. 403, 418 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 83 See James S. Kakalik et al., Just, Speedy, and Inexpensive? An Evaluation of Judicial Case 
Management Under the Civil Justice Reform Act, 49 ALA. L. REV. 17, 48 (1997); Judith Resnik, 
Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 380 (1982). 
 84 This is an important counter to a major concern of judicial management opponents—
that giving such discretionary power to trial judges without “particularized guidance” is 
improper and that “neither the drive for efficiency or finality . . . would properly warrant” such 
unstructured discretion. See Steven S. Gensler, Judicial Case Management: Caught in the 
Crossfire, 60 DUKE L.J. 669, 725 (2010). 
 85 See Resnik, supra note 83, at 380. Of course, as McPeek and Zubulake both illustrate, 
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legal merits of a discovery dispute before ruling on that dispute. As 
such, it represents an interesting compromise in the debate over 
managerial judging—a managerialist technique that enables a judge to 
obtain a neutral, merits-based determination on a disputed legal issue.86 
This point was well made by Judge Scheindlin in Zubulake I, when 
she noted that sampling would provide her with “tangible evidence of 
what the backup tapes may have to offer.”87 Both she and Judge Facciola 
in McPeek made it clear that they believed the purpose of sampling was 
to provide them with additional factual information so they could make 
better decisions more closely tied to the merits of the disputes.88 
It is indisputable that the federal courts have moved closer to a 
managerial judging model in the past thirty years, and that control over 
discovery has been at the center of that changed role.89 The move to 
managerial judging has engendered serious concerns. The first and most 
important is that judicial decisions regarding scheduling, discovery, and 
dispute resolution are being made primarily on the basis of cost and 
efficiency rather than careful consideration of cases’ underlying merits. 
Such concerns are manifested in fears that judges may be overzealously 
promoting settlement,90 cutting off promising but costly lines of 
discovery, imposing unnecessarily stringent time deadlines for 
 
sampling also provides the judge with particularized information about the costs of discovery in 
the individual case. 
 86 There is, of course, a certain ambiguity in the use of the term “merits” in this discussion. 
The precise “merits” on which the judge seeks information through sampling are the merits of 
the discovery dispute, not the merits of the litigation as a whole. In that regard, our 
endorsement of sampling and some prejudging of the merits should be distinguished from 
those scholars advocating the use of sampling to resolve merit determinations such as findings 
of liability or damages. See, e.g., Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Sampling Damages, 83 
IOWA L. REV. 545 (1998). A merits decision in the sampling context would not later be 
controlling: it is possible for the plaintiff’s position on the discovery dispute to be meritorious 
(if, for example, the discovery provides valuable information about defendant’s liability), but 
for the case itself to lack merit (if, for example, there is no proof of causation). Nonetheless, in 
most cases there is likely to be a strong positive relationship between the merits of the discovery 
dispute and the merits of the case. 
 87 217 F.R.D. 309, 324 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
 88 Id.; McPeek v. Ashcroft, 202 F.R.D. 31, 34–35 (2001). 
 89 Gensler, supra note 84, at 671–72 (“Starting in 1983 . . . a series of amendments have 
enshrined active judicial case management into the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure . . . formally validating it as a favored practice while encouraging and enabling it by 
giving district judges an ever-expanding set of case-management tools to be used in its 
pursuit.”). 
 90 See, e.g., E. Donald Elliott, Managerial Judging and the Evolution of Procedure, 53 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 306, 323 (1986); Patrick E. Higginbotham, Judge Robert A. Ainsworth, Jr. Memorial 
Lecture, Loyola University School of Law: So Why Do We Call Them Trial Courts?, 55 SMU L. 
REV. 1405, 1405 (2002); Peter H. Schuck, The Role of Judges in Settling Complex Cases: The 
Agent Orange Example, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 337, 347–48 (1986); Elizabeth G. Thornburg, The 
Managerial Judge Goes to Trial, 44 U. RICH. L. REV. 1261, 1264 (2010). But see Robert F. 
Peckham, The Federal Judge as a Case Manager: The New Role in Guiding a Case from Filing to 
Disposition, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 770, 772 (1981); Stephen N. Subrin, The Limitations of 
Transsubstantive Procedure: An Essay on Adjusting the “One Size Fits All” Assumption, 87 
DENV. U. L. REV. 377, 389 (2010). 
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completion of pretrial preparation, and generally making the efficient 
disposition of cases a greater concern than just adjudication on the 
merits.91 While these are undoubtedly dangers, there is serious 
disagreement among lawyers and judges as to whether they are the 
inevitable results of the managerial judging model or consequences of 
that model being applied improperly.92 
Two other concerns are the unreviewability of most of the 
decisions made by judges in their managerial capacity, and the 
bifurcation of the judge’s role between a magistrate judge who handles 
pretrial procedures and a district judge who adjudicates the merits of 
the case, but it is not clear how great a problem these concerns actually 
pose.93 Given the final judgment rule and the deferential standard of 
review applied to many district court decisions, a large amount of the 
decision-making done by district court judges is already effectively 
insulated from appellate review. How serious a problem this is depends 
in large part on the validity of the first concern—whether pretrial 
decision-making is systematically skewed away from merits-based 
considerations. Similarly, the concern over bifurcation of judicial roles 
seems largely based on similar concerns that magistrate judges will have 
less regard for the underlying merits of cases. 
Sampling is an extension of the managerial judging paradigm in 
that it gives the judge even greater leeway to shape the pretrial process. 
While judges already had the power to deny discovery or shift costs 
under the proportionality standard,94 sampling gives judges the power 
to reformulate, not merely limit the discovery request. We believe 
implicit in the power granted under 26(b)(2)(B) and (C) is the power of 
the court to order discovery it believes will be useful in determining the 
issues before it, even if neither party has requested such discovery.95 
 
 91 See Paul D. Carrington & Roger C. Cramton, Judicial Independence in Excess: Reviving 
the Judicial Duty of the Supreme Court, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 587, 627–28 (2009); Resnik, supra 
note 83, at 424–25. 
 92 Professor Resnik warns that even though such extensive pretrial involvement creates a 
more intimate relationship between the judge and the parties, “neither the Supreme Court, the 
lower federal courts, nor Congress has considered the effect of judicial management on 
impartiality” of judges. Resnik, supra note 83, at 428; see also Robert G. Bone, Who Decides? A 
Critical Look at Procedural Discretion, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1961, 1963 (2007); Gensler, supra 
note 84, at 688–743; Jay Tidmarsh, Pound’s Century, and Ours, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 513, 
559 (2006) (“Most case management powers have little or no effect on the metrics of cost, delay, 
and participant satisfaction.”). 
 93 Interestingly, surveys conducted by the FJC, the ABA, and a joint survey by the IAALS 
and ACTL all showed “strong support for active judicial case management” from lawyers. See 
Gensler, supra note 84, at 687. 
 94 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C). 
 95 The Rule’s command that the court must apply the proportionality test to limit discovery 
“on motion or on its own” is the source of this power. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C). 
Accordingly, if the court determines sampling data is required to resolve a discovery issue 
under Rule 26(b)(2)(C), it is free to order such discovery on its own. Of course, such sampling 
discovery will usually be a subset of the discovery being sought by one of the parties, but not 
necessarily. For example, a court might order discovery of a sample of difficult-to-access 
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Yet sampling is also different from traditional managerial judging, 
because, when properly understood and applied, it should function as 
an aid to merits-based adjudication, not an alternative to it. Sampling 
makes it possible for judges to get a sense of the actual content of the 
discovery being sought before ruling on its scope, duration and 
allocation of costs. It therefore has the potential to make merits 
considerations a stronger, more salient element in decision-making 
during the pretrial process and to counterbalance the cost and efficiency 
concerns that critics fear dominate the decision-making process at the 
pretrial stage. For example, Donald Elliott points out that narrowing 
issues through managerial judging may have the same impact on 
litigation as the grant of a motion to dismiss or partial summary 
judgment. When deciding such motions, a judge “must act according to 
law and provide a reasoned justification[] subject to appellate review.”96 
A judge who forecloses lines of inquiry based on managerial judging, in 
contrast, will rarely base her decisions “on the legal merits of the parties’ 
positions.”97 
Consider then the judge who forecloses or shifts costs with respect 
to discovery on a certain line of inquiry after a well-constructed 
sampling indicates that there is not much chance the plaintiff will be 
able to support its position with valuable evidence. This is clearly a 
“merits-based” determination and very likely a dispositive one; if the 
sampling had revealed a strong likelihood that the discovery sought 
would have proven valuable, the issue would have been resolved in 
plaintiff’s favor. To be sure, this is not quite a decision “according to 
law” for which the judge must provide a reasoned justification, but it is a 
factual determination regarding the merits, based on evidence specific 
to the case, for which the judge will probably write a reasoned opinion 
applying the Rule 26(b)(2)(C) proportionality factors. It is unlikely to be 
subject to appellate review, but is at least potentially and theoretically 
constrained by the “abuse of discretion” standard.98 The factual 
determination involved is, admittedly, a probabilistic one, as any factual 
determination based on a sampling methodology must be, but such 
probabilistic approaches to merits issues are certainly not unfamiliar to 
courts (for example, in preliminary injunction motions).99 
 
electronic data in order to determine more accurately the per unit cost of producing that data, 
even if neither side has requested such cost information. Of course, the court’s power is still 
limited to resolving the discovery dispute pending before it. This is not a free-ranging power to 
investigate the case through its own processes, as exists in some civil law courts. See, e.g., JAMES 
G. APPLE & ROBERT P. DEYLING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., A PRIMER ON THE CIVIL LAW SYSTEM 30 
(1995). 
 96 Elliot, supra note 90, at 311. 
 97 Id. 
 98 See Thornburg, supra note 90, at 1295–96. 
 99 See 11A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2948.3 (2d ed. 1995). 
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Like preliminary injunction motions, the application of sampling 
techniques to discovery disputes also involves a complex balance of 
merits-based concerns with considerations of cost and expediency. The 
fact that the preliminary injunction is being sought indicates that there 
is a perceived need for the court to act on less than a fully developed 
legal and factual record, yet within those constraining parameters the 
court strives to make an accurate—if probabilistic—determination of 
the merits in accordance with the law and the facts. Sampling is similar 
in that it is also applied when conditions of cost or expediency are said 
to require immediate judicial intervention,100 yet the court focuses its 
inquiry primarily on merits-based considerations, namely the likely 
content of the information being sought. 
We believe that this approach to sampling as a merits-based tool of 
managerial judging is the best perspective for understanding the 
sampling technique and developing a coherent and normatively 
justifiable set of “best practices” for its use. Again, Judge Scheindlin’s 
rulings in the Zubulake cases provide a useful illustration. In Zubulake I 
she recognized that application of the complex legal standard for 
disclosure of relatively inaccessible electronically stored information101 
required more and better factual information than she had concerning 
the content and cost of the disputed information. Accordingly, she 
ordered production of a “small sample” of that information, to provide 
herself with “tangible evidence” on these issues.102 In Zubulake III, she 
analyzed that sample and concluded that it provided relevant evidence 
to support plaintiff’s claims, primarily in that it contradicted a number 
of statements defendants had made in opposing those claims. At the 
same time, she concluded that “none of [the sampled e-mails] 
provide[d] any direct evidence of discrimination.”103 Applying these 
factual findings to the relevant legal standards, she held that 25% of the 
cost of restoration of the backup tapes should be shifted to plaintiffs.104 
The Zubulake opinions are clearly an exercise in managerial 
judging. The Judge not only resolved a discovery dispute, but did so in a 
way that gave substantial weight to considerations of cost and efficiency. 
Yet the decision in Zubulake is most influenced by the Judge’s nuanced 
view of the factual merits of the motion: the sample that revealed that 
 
 100 As demonstrated more fully infra, sampling is usually invoked after a party moves for a 
protective order arguing that the cost and burdens of the discovery sought outweigh its likely 
benefits. 
 101 In that opinion, Judge Scheindlin actually considers and reformulates a seven-factor 
version of the proportionality test, which she believes should be applied to the issue of cost-
shifting with regard to reasonably inaccessible electronically stored data. That test predates the 
2006 e-discovery amendment to Rule 26(b)(2)(B) and may have been partially superseded by it. 
Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 322. 
 102  Id. at 324. 
 103 Zubulake III, 216 F.R.D. at 286. 
 104 Id. at 286, 289. 
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the disputed information had some but not a great deal of relevance to 
the plaintiff’s claims. As such, it is certainly an individualized decision 
on the merits. 
We believe the Zubulake approach can act as a model of good 
sampling procedure. Note first that Judge Scheindlin treats sampling as 
“discovery about discovery,” a technique that enables her to find out 
more information about the discovery dispute before her so that she can 
render a finer-grained, more merits-based ruling on the motion. 
Implicit in this approach are a number of assumptions: 
First, sampling is primarily for the benefit of the judge, not the 
parties. Procedurally, this means that a party cannot move for 
sampling to take place or for a protective order against it. Rather, the 
decision to use sampling is within the discretion of the judge, to be 
used when the judge believes it will be helpful in resolving a 
discovery motion that is pending before her. Of course, there is 
nothing to prevent a party from suggesting to a judge that sampling 
might be useful in resolving a pending discovery issue.105 
The recognition that sampling is for the benefit of the judge also 
implies a broad general standard for its appropriate use. Sampling 
should be used to obtain the maximum amount of useful information 
for the judge at the minimum cost. While this may seem almost 
tautologous, we will see that it can be quite useful in some cases in 
deciding between the various sampling methods that have been utilized 
by different courts. The “maximization of useful information to the 
judge” standard requires a consideration of the limits of the court in 
reviewing and analyzing sampling data (even with the help of briefing 
by the parties) and also implies that the court should have very broad 
discretion in shaping the scope and amount of sampling that takes 
place. 
This approach also implies rejection of certain other conceptions of 
sampling. For instance, sampling should not be confused with “phased 
discovery,”106 such as partial granting of a motion to compel. While a 
sampling order may, in some cases, closely resemble that of partial 
 
 105 See, e.g., Class Plaintiffs’ Proposed Litigation Plan at 14 (Aug. 22, 2005) (Exhibit 8 to 
Class Plaintiffs’ Response to the Court’s Memorandum of June 6, 2005), Schwab v. Philip 
Morris USA, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 2d 992 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (No. CV-0401945) (proposing a plan for 
sampling of statistical evidence regarding class value in a mass torts action, which was adopted 
by Judge Weinstein). For the same reason, we reject the suggestion made by some 
commentators that sampling should be an automatic prerequisite to the resolution of discovery 
disputes involving backup tapes or other e-discovery. See Robert E. Altman & Benjamin Lewis, 
Cost-Shifting in ESI Discovery Disputes: A Five Factor Test to Promote Consistency and Set Party 
Expectations, 36 N. KY. L. REV. 569, 598–99 (2009). 
 106 The commentary to Rule 26 describes phased discovery as “regulating the timing and 
sequence of discovery . . . taking discovery from the most important or the most accessible 
sources before determining whether there is any need to cast the discovery net more widely.” 
FED. R. CIV. P. 26 cmt. 
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phased discovery, the purpose of the two orders is quite different. The 
court uses sampling to resolve the entire discovery dispute between the 
parties and to allocate the costs on a merits-based application of the 
proportionality standard. A court orders phased discovery in the hope 
that the information disclosed in that partial discovery will make further 
discovery unnecessary.107 Furthermore, partial phased discovery may 
sometimes represent a compromise of the discovery motion, giving each 
party a portion of what they sought. Sampling is a way to resolve the 
discovery dispute on the merits. 
Similarly, sampling should not be confused with a threshold 
motion, a merits-based hurdle that the party seeking discovery must 
pass before he becomes entitled to the benefits of the discovery process. 
Many have argued that the decisions in Twombly and Iqbal are an 
attempt to convert Rule 12(b)(6) into such a motion,108 and some have 
made similar arguments regarding class certification.109 While sampling 
will help ensure that the discovery motion is decided on its merits, the 
merits of the discovery motion are not the same as the merits of the 
overall claim. For example, plaintiffs would certainly be entitled to free 
discovery of data which sampling showed was strongly relevant to their 
claims of negligence, even if those plaintiffs were not yet able to provide 
satisfactory proof of causation. Even more fundamentally, however, the 
concept of “hurdles” implies that the party that seeking discovery has a 
presumption against him that must be overcome. The proportionality 
standard, to the contrary, provides for a multi-factor balancing test in 
which the presumption, if anywhere, is in favor of full disclosure.110 
The existence of sampling should also not be used as a basis for 
seeking changes in pleading standards and other aspects of the pretrial 
litigation process. Given the strong connection evident in Twombly and 
 
 107 Theoretically, the main difference between the two techniques is the judge’s ex ante belief 
about the existence of valuable information in the discovery requested. In partial phased 
discovery, the judge believes at least some portion of the discovery sought meets the 
proportionality test, and orders discovery of that portion. In sampling, the judge is uncertain 
whether any portion of the discovery sought meets the standard, and orders a sample to get 
better information about the discovery being sought. As a practical matter, the main difference 
is that phased discovery may include 50% or more of the discovery sought, while, for reasons 
stated infra, we believe sampling should be limited to 15% to 25% of the costs of the total 
discovery sought. 
 108 Miller, supra note 12, at 22 (“[P]lausibility pleading [has] undone . . . the limited function 
of the Rule 12(b)(6) motion[] . . . [and] has granted virtually unbridled discretion to district 
court judges . . . . [creating] a concern that some judges will allow their own views on various 
substantive matters to intrude on their decisionmaking . . . . ”). 
 109 See, e.g., 1 JOSEPH M. MCLAUGHLIN, MCLAUGHLIN ON CLASS ACTIONS § 3:12 (8th ed. 
2011); Judith Resnik, Fairness in Numbers: A Comment on AT&T v. Concepcion, Wal-Mart v. 
Dukes, and Turner v. Rogers, 125 HARV. L. REV. 78, 149 (2011). 
 110 See, e.g., Rachel Hytken, Electronic Discovery: To What Extent Do the 2006 Amendments 
Satisfy Their Purposes?, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 875, 887 (2008). While it is true that Rule 
26(b)(2)(B) imposes a requirement of “good cause” to obtain electronically stored data that is 
not reasonably accessible, the good cause requirement seems to be the functional equivalent of 
the 26(b)(2)(C) proportionality test. 
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Iqbal between heightened pleading standards and fears of abusive and 
costly discovery, it is tempting for litigants to argue for the application 
of a relatively low pleading standard based on the assurance that 
sampling techniques will be applied to prevent abusive discovery. The 
problem with such arguments is that a judge who denied a motion to 
dismiss on the grounds that costly or abusive discovery can be avoided 
at the pretrial stage, would likely feel obligated to apply a higher-than-
usual standard of relevance to the proportionality analysis in subsequent 
discovery disputes.111 Again, this goes against the principle of neutral 
merits-based adjudication of discovery disputes that sampling is meant 
to promote. 
A final charge that can be made against the widespread use of 
sampling is that it necessarily involves the court in prejudging the merits 
of the underlying dispute. In some respects, this objection is absolutely 
valid. Indeed, the entire argument thus far has shown that to properly 
adjudicate discovery disputes in accordance with the proportionality 
standard, courts must develop information regarding the merits of the 
underlying dispute, and sampling is generally the optimal method of 
obtaining such information. The question is not whether this constitutes 
prejudgment, but whether such prejudgment is harmful to the litigation 
process, and, if so, whether there are ways this harm can be minimized. 
First, it is worth noting that neither the rule-makers nor the courts 
seem nearly as concerned about prejudgment as they once did. 
Emblematic of that change is the diminished significance of Eisen v. 
Carlisle & Jacquelin,112 in which the Supreme Court strongly criticized 
the use of a merits-based inquiry as the basis for cost-shifting of class 
action notice fees made “in the absence of established safeguards.”113 In 
last year’s Wal-Mart decision,114 the Supreme Court itself engaged in 
substantial consideration of the underlying merits in ruling on the class 
certification motion, and freely admitted it was doing so.115 In light of 
the growth of managerial judging obligations, the Wal-Mart majority 
 
 111 We are speaking here, of course, about arguments tied to an individual case, like the one 
in Iqbal, in which plaintiffs argued that discovery could be limited, an argument specifically 
rejected in the majority opinion. We do not mean to foreclose the possibility of arguing for a 
general lowering of the pleading standard (perhaps by Federal Rule) on the grounds that 
sampling and other managerial judging techniques have significantly reduced the problem of 
abusive discovery. Unfortunately, the empirical evidence to support such an argument does not 
yet appear to be available. 
 112 417 U.S. 156, 178 (1974). 
 113 Id. at 178. 
 114 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S.Ct. 2541 (2011). 
 115 Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, acknowledged that “[a] ‘rigorous analysis’ [of the 
class certification issues] will entail some overlap with the merits of the plaintiff’s underlying 
claim,” but observed that “[t]he necessity of touching aspects of the merits in order to resolve 
preliminary matters, e.g., jurisdiction and venue, is a familiar feature of litigation.” Id. at 2551–
52. The Eisen decision was essentially limited to its facts, and its warnings about the lack of 
procedural safeguards in pretrial merits determinations were effectively rejected. Id. at 2552 n.6. 
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certainly has a point. A rule against prejudging that asks judges to 
eschew any consideration of the merits prior to trial would be extremely 
detrimental to current pretrial practice. Given the rarity of trials, a 
merits-based decision at the pretrial phase is the only merits-based 
judgment the parties are likely to obtain. Moreover, given the 
importance of careful and nuanced considerations of the individualized 
merits in Rule 12(b)(6) motions, class certification, and discovery 
matters, a general rule against prejudgments would clearly do more 
harm than good. Rather, as we have argued in this Section, one of the 
main benefits of sampling is that it allows for judges to make better 
prejudgments on the merits. 
That said, however, the question remains whether concerns over 
prejudging can be minimized. Those concerns are largely of two types—
lack of trial-level procedural safeguards in pretrial hearings, and a loss of 
neutrality or impartiality by judges unduly influenced by the pretrial 
arguments or disclosures. As to the former, one cannot expect every 
pretrial hearing to have the procedural safeguards of a trial, but the most 
basic aspects of due process—notice to all parties, an opportunity to be 
heard, and transparency of decision-making—can and should be 
preserved in any sampling procedure. 
As to the second concern, it is worth noting that in many other 
prejudging procedures, a degree of tentativeness is recognized and 
opportunities for revision are maintained. Preliminary injunctions 
require the winning party to post a bond. Certified classes may be 
decertified. The fact that the majority of sampling decisions involve 
cost-shifting seems to us to provide a similar recognition of 
tentativeness. A plaintiff who is informed that he will have to bear the 
costs of further discovery has not lost his case. He has not even lost his 
chance at further discovery. But he has received a powerful signal that 
the judge does not think much of the evidence he has adduced thus far. 
Similarly, a judge who shifts part of the costs of discovery, as Judge 
Scheindlin did in Zubulake, may be sending a carefully calibrated signal 
to the parties as to “where things stand,” which may guide them in 
further pretrial actions or promote a settlement which mirrors the 
underlying merits of the claim. In short, if judges and parties recognize 
that a cost-shifting decision is not a final judgment, but a way of 
evaluating where things currently stand, at least with regard to the 
particular issue before the court, it is likely to do more good than harm 
for the litigation process.116 
II.     STATISTICAL AND DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS OF REPORTED SAMPLING 
 
 116 This does not address the question of whether costs, once shifted, should be shifted back 
if parties are able to make a stronger showing at a later stage. That and related issues are 
discussed in Part III, infra. 
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CASES 
A.     The Patchwork of Judicial Approaches 
We turn now from our normative justification for sampling to an 
analysis of the ground-level decision-making about sampling. We have 
identified forty cases since 1999 that discuss sampling.117 Although these 
cases, taken as a whole, demonstrate that sampling has become an 
established technique for adjudicating electronic discovery disputes, our 
analysis of the reported cases has also uncovered a wide disparity of 
approaches in the ways in which courts conceive and implement 
sampling methods. 
At the most basic level, courts differ as to what the purpose of 
sampling is. Most courts approach sampling as information gathering 
for purposes of applying the proportionality or “good cause” standards. 
This is the purpose conceived of in both McPeek and Zubulake, and the 
one we adopt here. The purpose in ordering sampling in those cases was 
not to provide the requesting party with documents (although that 
certainly was a consequence), but rather to reduce uncertainty in the 
court’s analysis.118 Some courts, however, have used sampling as a way 
to incrementalize, or “phase,” discovery in order to provide a middle 
ground or compromise between the respective positions of the parties. 
For instance, the district court in Barrera v. Boughton ordered discovery 
as part of a “phased approach,”119 in order to constrain costs. This is an 
approach, as noted, that we disagree with, but its use as a justification 
for sampling is nonetheless worth noting. 
A second disagreement among the courts is whether the 
information gathered through sampling should be used to shift the costs 
of additional discovery or cut-off discovery entirely. Both approaches 
are arguably consistent with the goal of minimizing undue expenses, as 
contemplated by the proportionality standard. But, as discussed herein, 
there are reasons for preferring different results in different situations.120 
A third major issue in sampling of e-discovery cases is precisely 
what sort of methodology will be employed. Courts have devised a 
number of methods for sampling, but neither courts nor commentators 
 
 117 For a list of these cases, see infra note 131. Although the descriptive portions of this 
Article include considerations of all the reported cases, state and federal, for reasons set forth 
infra, the statistical analysis is limited to thirty-two reported federal court decisions. 
 118 See David Degnan, Accounting for the Costs of Electronic Discovery, 12 MINN. J.L. SCI. & 
TECH. 151, 173–74 (2011) (“Sampling allows the requesting parties to take a snap shot of the 
producing party’s files and draw conclusions of the whole population based on those 
findings.”). 
 119 No. 3:07cv1436, 2010 WL 3926070, at *3 (D. Conn. Sept. 30, 2010); see also Haka v. 
Lincoln Cnty., 246 F.R.D. 577, 579 (W.D. Wis. 2007) (ordering the parties to proceed 
“incrementally”). 
 120 See infra Part III.D. 
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have provided a justification for the methodology selected. For instance, 
the approach adopted in McPeek is what we will call the “court order” 
approach: the court selects which backup tapes will be sampled based on 
the court’s understanding of what tapes are most likely to yield relevant 
documents.121 A court may request sampling proposals from the parties, 
and may even allow the deposition of persons familiar with the data 
storage system in order to best inform the court’s order.122 A second 
approach, utilized in Zubulake, is to delimit the sample size but leave the 
selection of tapes to be sampled to the requesting party. This approach 
will hereafter be referred to as the “best-case scenario” approach, and 
the theory behind it is that the requesting party will have the most 
information about what it is seeking and therefore can most effectively 
select the sample that will yield relevant documents. At least one court 
has also applied the converse of this approach: allowing the party 
bearing the potential costs (i.e., the responding party) to define the 
terms of the sample, subject to court approval.123 A third more 
deferential approach—identified here as the “stipulation” approach—is 
to leave the decision of what to sample to the parties. A fourth approach 
is scientific sampling. That is, randomized sampling supported by a 
scientifically sound methodology as likely advocated by an expert 
witness. As the Fifth Circuit has explained, “[b]y random sampling, we 
mean adhering to a statistically sound protocol for sampling 
documents” and the use of expert assistance in constructing any 
protocol.124 
Scientific sampling has been suggested by some courts as an 
alternative to the other three sampling approaches based on criticisms 
that non-scientific sampling does not provide accurate data upon which 
cost-shifting analysis may be based.125 For instance, the Seventh Circuit 
has expressed concern with sampling procedures that are “inherently 
arbitrary” and lack a “logical foundation” because the sample is entirely 
up to one party’s discretion and creates “every incentive to cherry-pick,” 
 
 121 See, e.g., Hagemeyer N. Am., Inc. v. Gateway Data Sci. Corp., 222 F.R.D. 594, 603 (E.D. 
Wis. 2004) (implementing the methodological approach). 
 122 See Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. Ace Am. Reinsurance Co., No. 05 Civ. 9170, 2006 WL 
3771090, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2006) (“The parties shall therefore propose a protocol for 
sampling . . . . In order to facilitate that process, counsel may take the deposition of . . . persons 
familiar with [defendant’s] data storage system.”). 
 123 Ingersoll v. Farmland Foods, Inc., No. 10–6046, 2011 WL 1131129 (W.D. Mo. Mar. 28, 
2011). 
 124 In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., Nos. 06-30378, 06-30379, 2006 WL 1726675, at *2 n.5 (5th 
Cir. May 26, 2006) (per curiam); see also Degnan, supra note 118, at 174 (“[T]he sample must 
be random, must compare the same type of variables, must have a representative sample size, 
and must use a statistically valid method that is planned beforehand.”). 
 125 In other cases, courts have simply crafted the sample in such a way to avoid 
representativeness concerns. See, e.g., Quinby v. WestLB AG, 245 F.R.D. 94, 107 (S.D.N.Y. 
2006) (requiring the sampling of certain e-mails in response to the defendant’s objection that 
sampling is inherently flawed because there is a stronger likelihood of responsive documents 
from the sampled period than from other periods). 
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thereby producing an unrepresentative sample of the universe of 
documents.126 In fact, at least one commentator has argued that the 
absence of a scientifically valid sampling approach could pose due 
process issues: 
A sample cannot be extrapolated if [it] is not statistically valid, 
because the margin of error would not produce results that are 
accurate with a high degree of certainty. A court will likely overturn 
any such sampling protocol on due process grounds if the margin of 
error is too high. . . . ‘[A court] may adopt statistical sampling and 
extrapolation as a case management tool only when the specific 
methodology to be used is tailored to produce a result at least as fair 
and accurate as would be produced by traditional particularistic fact-
finding methods.’127 
Related to this disagreement over what sampling methodology to 
use, there has also been wide variation among courts in terms of how 
large of a sample should be selected. Some courts have sampled as much 
as a quarter of the backup tape documents being requested. Others have 
opted for a smaller sample, limiting it to a few backup tapes. 
A fourth point of divergence is the variable factors that cause a 
court to order or deny sampling, or to ultimately shift costs after the 
sampling has occurred. Court decisions are frequently unclear as to 
which factors lead them to order or reject sampling. In most cases, 
sampling is ordered without discussion of such reasons. The next 
Section seeks to apply statistical methods to delineate the factors that 
may influence a court’s decision. 
One final issue raised by the Sedona Conference, but which has 
received limited discussion from courts, is whether the responding party 
should always pay for the sampling.128 Courts have acted consistently in 
this regard: almost universally courts have imposed the cost of sampling 
on the producing party. Yet no reported decision provides any 
justification for such an allocation. The closest a court has come is in 
Kipperman v. Onex Corp.129 where the court made the requesting party 
“the guarantor of the search’s success” and granted the producing party 
the right to demand fees if the sampling produced little discoverable 
 
 126 Am. Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. of Chi. v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y, 406 F.3d 867, 879 
(7th Cir. 2005). Courts have emphasized similar methodological concerns in other aspects of e-
discovery. See William A. Gross Constr. Assocs., Inc. v. Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., 256 F.R.D. 134 
(S.D.N.Y. 2009) (discussing keyword searches); Gonzales v. Google, Inc., 234 F.R.D. 674 (N.D. 
Cal. 2006) (discussing URLs); Herbert L. Roitblat, Search and Information Retrieval Science, 8 
SEDONA CONF. J. 225 (2007). 
 127 See, e.g., Degnan, supra note 118, at 174–75 (quoting Scottsdale Mem. Health v. Maricopa 
Cnty., 228 P.3d 117, 134 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010)). 
 128 Laura E. Ellsworth & Robert Pass, Cost Shifting in Electronic Discovery, 5 SEDONA CONF. 
J. 125, 147 (2004). 
 129 260 F.R.D. 682, 690 (N.D. Ga. 2009). 
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information.130 
B.     How Courts Sample 
Given the wide qualitative variations in when and how courts 
sample in electronic discovery disputes, we have undertaken an 
empirical investigation to make sense of this patchwork of approaches 
to discovery sampling. 
1.     Data Description and Methodology 
For our empirical models, we rely on data from federal district 
court cases from 2001 to the present. Our database includes thirty-two 
federal district court opinions contemplating the use of sampling 
techniques to manage electronic discovery cost disputes.131 We thus 
 
 130 Ultimately, in Kipperman, the sampling was a success and so the court never revisited the 
issue of shifting the costs for the initial sample. Additionally, in Makrakis v. Demelis, No. 09-
706-C, 2010 WL 3004337, at *2 (Mass. Super. Ct. July 13, 2010), the court ordered that the 
requesting party bear the initial cost of the sampling with leave to seek reimbursement for those 
costs if the sampling proved successful. However, since Makrakis was a state court decision, it 
has not been included in our data set. 
 131 Our data set is drawn from the following cases: Ingersoll v. Farmland Foods, Inc., No. 10-
6046, 2011 WL 1131129 (W.D. Mo. Mar. 28, 2011); Barrera v. Boughton, No. 3:07cv1436, 2010 
WL 3926070, at *3 (D. Conn. Sept. 30, 2010); Kipperman, 260 F.R.D. 682; D’Onofrio v. SFX 
Sports Grp., Inc., 256 F.R.D. 277 (D.D.C. 2009); Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Collins & Aikman 
Corp., 256 F.R.D. 403 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); William A. Gross Constr. Assocs., 256 F.R.D. 134; Major 
Tours, Inc. v. Colorel, No. 05-3091, 2009 WL 3446761, at *6, n.7 (D.N.J. Oct. 20, 2009); U & I 
Corp. v. Advanced Med. Design, Inc., 251 F.R.D. 667 (M.D. Fla. 2008); Victor Stanley, Inc. v. 
Creative Pipe, Inc., 250 F.R.D. 251 (D. Md. 2008); Parkdale Am., LLC v. Travelers Cas. & Sur. 
Co. of Am., Inc., No. 3:06CV78, 2007 WL 4165247 (W.D.N.C. Nov. 19, 2007); Haka v. Lincoln 
Cnty., 246 F.R.D. 577 (W.D. Wis. 2007); Hill v. Eddie Bauer, 242 F.R.D. 556 (C.D. Cal. 2007); 
Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. Ace Am. Reinsurance Co., No. 05 Civ. 9170, 2006 WL 3771090 
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2006); Quinby v. WestLB AG, 245 F.R.D. 94 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); Semsroth v. 
City of Wichita, 239 F.R.D. 630 (D. Kan. 2006); Thompson v. Jiffy Lube Intern., Inc., No. 05-
1203, 2006 WL 1174040 (D. Kan. May 1, 2006); Hopson v. Mayor & City Council of Balt., 232 
F.R.D. 228 (D. Md. 2005); Wiginton v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc., 229 F.R.D. 568 (N.D. Ill. 2004); 
Hagemeyer N. Am., Inc. v. Gateway Data Scis. Corp., 222 F.R.D. 594 (E.D. Wis. 2004); 
Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc. v. Michelson, 229 F.R.D. 550 (W.D. Tenn. 2003); Zubulake III, 
216 F.R.D. 280 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Rowe Entm’t, Inc. 
v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. Fluor 
Daniel, Inc., No. 99-3564, 2002 WL 246439 (E.D. La. Feb. 19, 2002); McPeek v. Ashcroft, 202 
F.R.D. 31 (D.D.C. 2001); AAB Joint Venture v. United States, 75 Fed. Cl. 432, 443–44 (Fed. Cl. 
2007); Farmers Ins. Co. v. Peterson, 81 P.3d 659 (Okla. 2003); Toshiba Am. Elec. Components, 
Inc. v. Super. Ct., 21 Cal. Rptr. 3d 532, 541 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004); Makrakis v. Demelis, No. 09-
706, 2010 WL 3004337 (Mass. Super. Ct. 2010); Linnen v. A.H. Robins Co., Inc., No. 97-2307, 
1999 WL 462015 (Mass. Super. Ct. 1999); Delta Fin. Corp. v. Morrison, 819 N.Y.S.2d 908 (Sup. 
Ct. 2006); Bank of Am. Corp. v. SR Intern. Bus. Ins. Co., No. 05-CVS-5564, 2006 WL 3093174, 
at *15 (N.C. Super. Ct. Nov. 1, 2006); Brokaw v. Davol, Inc., Nos. 07-5058, 07-4048, 07-1076, 
2011 WL 579039, at n.7 (R.I. Super. Ct. Feb. 15, 2011); Defendant’s Response to Plaintiff’s 
Motion to Compel, Calixto v. Watson Bowman Acme Corp., No. 007CV60077 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 
26, 2009), 2009 WL 826089; Defendant’s Motion for Protective Order, Wyckoff v. United 
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captured litigation during a period of approximately ten years. The 
earliest opinion concerning sampling uncovered in the course of our 
investigation was a 1999 opinion from a state court. We excluded that 
opinion and other state court opinions from our data set to remove 
jurisdiction-specific discovery rule variation from our analysis. We 
searched in the WESTLAW federal “AllCases” database for opinions 
discussing “sampling,” “phased discovery,” or a “test-run” in electronic 
discovery disputes. These search results were checked against a search of 
the LEXIS “Mega” database using the same search terms. We also 
searched civil trial court filings through WESTLAW and LEXIS using 
the same search terms to identify cases in which sampling was proposed 
but was not necessarily mentioned in a court’s opinion. Additionally, we 
compiled a list of citations both cited in these opinions and citing these 
opinions, and included any additional cases discussing sampling. For 
instance, as McPeek and Zubulake are arguably the originating cases for 
the sampling methodology, we Shepardized these cases to identify 
decisions not picked up through keyword searches. Once cases had been 
identified by this method, we attempted to gather additional 
information about case characteristics from docket entries using the 
LEXIS Total Litigator CourtLink and Public Access to Court Electronic 
Records (PACER). 
Our multivariate analysis endeavors to shed light on a few central 
issues relating to sampling: 1) under what circumstances do courts 
order sampling?; 2) when sampling is ordered, by what method is it 
conducted?; and 3) does the decision to order sampling play any role in 
whether cost-shifting or a cut-off of discovery is ordered? Our general, 
intuitive thesis is that courts make decisions about when and how to 
sample and whether to shift costs following sampling based on a 
number of variable factors. Accordingly, in answering these questions, 
our analysis considers the following independent variables: 
1) Amount in Controversy (AmtCont): The logged total amount in 
controversy as presented to a court by the plaintiff, often in the prayer 
for relief section of a complaint or in a subsequent filing. 
 
States, No. 307CV02301 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 21, 2009), 2009 WL 3661465; Defendant’s Reply in 
Support of its Motion for Protective Order as to Re-Creation of Back-Up Server Tapes, Mount 
Sinai Med. Center of Fla., Inc. v. Mckesson Med. Mgmt., LLC, No. 06-21518-Civ-
Atlonaga/Turnoff (S.D. Fla. Jan. 22, 2007), 2007 WL 617088; Opposition of Plaintiffs to 
Defendants’ Second Motion to Compel Discovery, In re Pharm. Indus. Average Wholesale 
Price Litig., No. 01-CV-12257 (D. Mass. Feb. 14, 2006), 2006 WL 4578352; Plaintiff’s 
Memorandum Opposing Defendant’s Motion for Protective Order, Bergerson v. Deephaven 
Capital Mgmt., LLC, No. 03-1090 (D. Minn. Oct. 19, 2004), 2004 WL 3370915; Memorandum 
of Law in Support of Protective Order and Cost-Shifting, Wolf Concept S.A.R.L. v. Eber Bros. 
Wine & Liquor Corp., No. 607CV06233 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 2009), 2009 WL 4839819; 
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Protective Order, USA, ex rel. Jeffrey 
Judd, Relator, v. Maloy, No. 3-03-241 (S.D. Ohio. Mar. 8, 2006), 2006 WL 1111924; Brief in 
Support of Defendants’ Motion for Protective Order, Camesi v. Univ. of Pittsburgh Med. Ctr., 
No. 09-CV-085 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 25, 2010), 2010 WL 4545724. 
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2) Total Cost of Discovery (CostDisc): The logged total cost of 
ordering the discovery that is at issue in a controversy. To be clear, this 
variable does not reflect the overall cost of discovery in litigation; rather, 
it reflects the total cost that would be incurred by the producing party in 
the event that cost-shifting or a limitation of discovery was denied. In 
most cases this figure incorporates the costs of restoring backup tapes, 
expert fees, and attorneys’ fees associated with reviewing the documents 
for privilege. 
3) Sampling Cost (CostSamp): The logged estimated or actual cost 
of a sample to be ordered by a court. Where both figures are available, 
our model uses the estimated costs because the ordering of sampling is 
an ex ante decision that is made without the benefit of the actual cost 
data. Where a cost range is presented for the estimated cost of sampling, 
we have used the high end of the cost range. 
4) Percent of Amount in Controversy (PerAmtCont): This variable is 
calculated by dividing CostDisc by AmtCont in order to determine the 
percentage of a potential recovery that is made up by the cost of 
discovery. This variable functionally captures the third element of the 
Zubulake cost-shifting test: the total cost of production compared to the 
amount in controversy.132 This is an important consideration because, 
as Judge Scheindlin has stated, “where the cost of a sample restoration is 
significant compared to the value of the suit, or where the suit itself is 
patently frivolous, even this minor effort may be inappropriate.”133 
5) Percent of Total Cost (PerCostDisc): This variable is calculated by 
dividing CostSamp by CostDisc to determine the proportional share of 
the total cost of discovery that is being selected for sampling by a court. 
6) Cost-Shifting or Discovery Cut-off (CostShift): This binary 
variable reflects whether the dispute centers on a request by a producing 
party that costs be shifted or that certain discovery be cut-off. 
7) Asymmetric Discovery (AsymDisc): This binary variable indicates 
whether the parties had asymmetric discovery obligations. Research 
indicates that asymmetrical discovery obligations affect parties’ abilities 
to reach agreements in discovery disputes and their settlement 
decisions.134 In cases where discovery burdens are symmetrical, parties 
may be more willing to reach private agreements to limit costs. This 
variable also, to some extent, reflects the fifth element of the Zubulake 
cost-shifting test: the relative incentives of each party to control costs.135 
8) Government as a Party (Govt): This binary variable reflects 
whether the government is a party. While many suits involving the 
government have asymmetric discovery burdens (which would be 
 
 132 Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 322. 
 133 Id. at 324 n.77. 
 134 See Hay, supra note 5, at 30–34 (1995). 
 135 Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 322. 
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captured by the AsymDisc variable),136 this variable is included to reflect 
the unique factors involved when a government is a party. 
Our methodological choices have been influenced by the size and 
in some cases incompleteness of our data set. Specifically, there are a 
sizable number of missing cases for some independent variables. In 
many cases the cost-related variables (e.g., total cost of discovery and 
sampling costs) were not reported in the court opinions or parties’ 
pleadings. In those instances, inclusion of those cases in a multivariate 
analysis will present significant methodological difficulties.137 Further, 
even where the data is complete, because many of the variables in our 
analysis are binary (e.g., whether the court sampled or not), and our 
overall data set is small, the data is not well suited for multivariate 
regression analysis. In an attempt to best utilize what data does exist 
about sampling, our empirical analysis uses two separate statistical 
approaches. One is a univariate approach involving linear regressions to 
predict the decision to sample or shift costs. Univariate analyses permit 
evaluation of the entire effect of a particular variable on the decision to 
sample or shift costs.138 Linear regression modeling allows us to 
determine the linear function that most accurately characterizes the 
relationship between two variables.139 We have used univariate linear 
regressions to analyze the effect of the cost variables (amount in 
controversy, total cost of discovery, and cost of sampling) on the 
decision to sample or shift costs. In such analyses, the dependent 
variable is a dichotomy: in our first set of regressions the value of 1 if 
sampling is ordered and 0 if it is not. The probability of ordering 
sampling is a nonlinear function of the exogenous variables (described 
herein). Examining the coefficient estimates and p-values allows the 
identification of the variables that produce statistically significant effects 
on the decision to sample. In the second set of regressions, the value of 1 
is cost-shifting or the cutting off of discovery, and 0 is the authorization 
of full discovery. Again, the probability of ordering cost-shifting or the 
cut-off of discovery is a nonlinear function, and the coefficients and p-
 
 136 Generally, either the government is being sued and bears the brunt of the discovery 
burdens, or the government is suing and it is the defendant that bears the costs. In both cases 
asymmetries often emerge. 
 137 Specifically, we would either need to exclude those cases from our data set (which would 
reduce our set to fifteen cases) or, in lieu of deletion, include estimated “dummy” variables for 
the missing data, which might produce substantially different results. See JACOB COHEN ET AL., 
APPLIED MULTIPLE REGRESSION/CORRELATION ANALYSIS FOR THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 450 
(3d ed. 2003) (noting that dropping cases with missing data is disfavored). 
 138 By contrast, a multivariate comparison shows the aggregate effect of all variables and 
only details the marginal effect of each variable. While such an analysis could be illuminating, 
the data set here is not well suited to such a methodology for the reasons described herein. 
 139 This function is expressed by the equation y = bx + c, where y is the predicted value of a 
dependent variable (here, whether sampling or cost-shifting is ordered), x is the value of the 
exogenous variable (here, for instance, the cost of discovery), b is the slope of the line of best fit, 
and c is the y-intercept of the line. 
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values allow the identification of those variables that have a significant 
effect on the decision to cut-off discovery or shift costs. We have used 
this method of analysis for all non-binary independent variables 
(AmtCont, CostDisc, CostSamp, PerAmtCont, and PerCostDisc). 
Our second statistical approach uses two-way classification tables 
to analyze the interaction between binary variables (for instance, the 
effect of asymmetric discovery obligations on the decision to sample). 
We offer our results in two formats: (i) interpretation of the data 
displayed in each table, and (ii) inferential analysis. In interpreting the 
tables, the data should be read row-by-row from left to right. The 
independent variables (e.g., whether discovery obligations are 
asymmetrical), which only have two possible variations, are displayed in 
each row. The dependent variables (e.g., whether sampling is ordered) 
are notated by column. As the independent variable changes (the first 
row compared to the second), theoretically we should be able to detect 
whether and how the dependent variable changes based on observed 
data frequencies. We have used a Fisher’s Exact Test, which indicates 
whether the distribution in the two-by-two matrix is due to something 
other than chance. If the calculated p-value is less than 0.05,140 the null 
hypothesis is refuted and the research hypothesis is corroborated (i.e., 
the distribution is not dependent on chance). The chi-squared test is the 
most frequently used method of inferential statistical testing for two-by-
two contingency tables. Here, however, it is inappropriate because the 
expected frequencies in any cell are around or less than five.141 Fisher’s 
Exact Test is most appropriate where the total sample size is small to 
moderate.142 Further, because the chi-squared test relies on large sample 
approximations, in a small sample (as it is here) it could result in skewed 
approximations, yielding higher calculated values and making it easier 
to reject incorrectly the null hypothesis. Fisher’s Exact Test, on the other 
hand, calculates a true level of significance.143 Notably, though, a 
limitation of this test is that it cannot measure the strength of the effect 
in the event it is significant. 
Before reviewing the results of these analyses, we pause to mention 
a few shortcomings in our methodology. First, our initial data set—
comprising fewer than fifty cases—is a very small sample size. Second, 
research related to court orders on discovery can raise a number of 
issues regarding representativeness given the fact that many discovery 
orders are issued by magistrate judges—sometimes orally—and are 
 
 140 The level of statistical significance adopted for testing all hypotheses in this study is 0.05 
(the standard measure). This means that there is a five percent chance of being wrong in 
finding that dependent and independent variables are related when random chance could be 
the reason for their apparent relationship. 
 141 THEODORE COLTON, STATISTICS IN MEDICINE 164–65 (1974). 
 142 HUBERT M. BLALOCK, JR., SOCIAL STATISTICS 292 (2d ed. 1979). 
 143 C. Frank Starmer et al., Some Reasons for Not Using the Yates Continuity Correction on 2 
x 2 Contingency Tables, 69 J. AM. STAT. ASS’N 346, 376–78 (1974). 
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often unreported by publishing services. Even in the cases where a 
judge’s decision ordering sampling is published, there is a likelihood 
that the parties will independently resolve the issue, either by working 
out the discovery dispute on their own or settling the case. In particular, 
our methodology likely undercounts cases in which sampling was 
denied, as courts may not mention a party’s suggestion that the court 
order sampling.144 Lastly, on a more theoretical level (a subject discussed 
at length infra), we have ascribed methodological categories to courts’ 
sampling decisions when in all likelihood these courts never intended to 
design a sampling protocol. A close reading of the cases reveals ad hoc 
decision-making without any substantial discussion of prior courts’ 
methodological choices. Nonetheless, despite these shortcomings our 
hope is that through the patterns revealed by the data, and our more 
general theoretical discussion and guidance for administering sampling, 
we can provide some coherence to disparate sampling approaches. 
2.     Results 
We have analyzed the data to answer three primary questions: (a) 
when do courts sample; (b) how is sampling conducted; and (c) in what 
cases are costs then shifted? Our findings relating to those questions 
along with other observations relating to the data are set forth herein. 
a.     When Do Courts Sample? 
Our review of district court opinions indicates that in those cases 
in which sampling was discussed, it was ordered 84.38% of the time. 
This figure is unsurprising where courts have raised the issue of 
sampling; intuitively it is unlikely that a court would raise the possibility 
only to shoot it down. In fact, it appears that in all but one case in which 
sampling was not ordered, it was a party and not the court that 
suggested sampling. A review of the characteristics of the cases in which 
sampling was conducted reveals an observed preference for cases in 
which discovery obligations were asymmetrical (see Table 1). The odds 
ratios displayed in Table 1 demonstrate that in those cases in which 
sampling is ordered, there is a 56.25% chance that the parties to the 
litigation had asymmetric discovery obligations. However, while 
anecdotally interesting, the presence of asymmetric discovery 
obligations is not predictive of sampling being ordered, as the results are 
 
 144 To account for this concern, we searched district court filings for references to sampling 
in an effort to capture those cases in which sampling was suggested and summarily dismissed 
by the court. Nonetheless, not all trial court filings are searchable. 
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statistically insignificant and the null hypothesis cannot be rejected.145 
 
 145 Whether taking the Fisher’s Exact Test one- or two-tailed results, the p-values are wholly 
not significant (0.572, one-tailed, 1.00, two-tailed). 
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Table 1 


















Statistically, similar results are revealed when reviewing the 
presence of the government as a party. In 25% of the cases in our data 
set the government was a party. A Fisher’s Exact Test reveals that the 
correlation between the government as a party and sampling being 
ordered is not significant.146 This result is not surprising; especially 
because in 59.38% of the cases in which sampling was ordered, the 
government was not a party. Nonetheless, the correlation between the 
government as a party and sampling should not necessarily be rejected. 
While more often than not sampling is ordered in cases in which the 
government is not involved, in each of the cases in our data set where 
the government was a party, the government was the responding party 
to document requests. As the government is not party to roughly a third 
of all federal civil cases, this suggests that courts may be more interested 
in relying on sampling where the government is involved. Such a 
conclusion is further supported by Judge Francis’s commentary in 
McPeek that traditional cost-shifting analyses ignore the fact that a 
government has to have its employees do the restoration or risk 
confidential information being seen by someone not employed by the 
government, and therefore a decision to order additional discovery will 
necessitate the diversion of government resources.147 Accordingly, 
sampling in those cases may suggest a sensitivity for such concerns. 
 
 146 Table 2 indicates that the p-value for a one-tailed test is 0.506, and again 1.00 for a two-
tailed test. Neither of these results is close to significant statistically. 
 147 McPeek v. Ashcroft, 202 F.R.D. 31, 34 (D.D.C. 2001). 
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Table 2 


















Arguably the best predictors of the decision to sample—to the 
extent any exogenous variable can predict a court’s decision to sample—
are the variables relating to economics of the litigation: the total amount 
in controversy, the total cost of discovery, and the cost of sampling. A 
series of linear regressions (the results of which are displayed in Table 3) 
reveal that the total amount in controversy and the total cost of 
discovery have a significant correlation with the decision to sample. 
That is, as the total amount in controversy and cost of discovery rise, it 
is more likely that a court will order sampling. These results are 
significant at the p > 0.05 level. 
Table 3 
Monetary Factors 









Cost of Sample 
(CostSamp) .1336378 0.417 





Percent of Discovery 
Costs (PerCostDisc) -1.24611 0.000 
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However, the cost of a sample has an insignificant effect on the 
decision to sample. Such a finding is intuitive because the cost of the 
sample is within a court’s control (i.e., if the cost of the sample is too 
high, the court can decrease the size of the sample). Our findings as to 
the PerCostDisc variable (cost of sample/total cost of discovery) further 
confirm this finding; sampling was ordered in all instances in which the 
cost of the sample was less than or equal to 25% of the total cost of 
discovery. Of course, this poses a causality question: does the 
comparatively lower sampling cost compared to the total cost of 
discovery influence a decision to order sampling? Or is it that courts 
order sampling and then, in order to effectuate the purposes of 
sampling, limit the size of the sample? More simply, does the 
PerCostDisc variable reflect an ex ante or ex post calculation by the 
court? Because courts can modulate the size of a sample after making 
the decision to sample, it is unlikely that this variable is predictive in 
most cases. That said, there are two reasons not to dismiss PerCostDisc 
as having no predictive value. First, the cost of sampling compared to 
the total cost of discovery may be relevant in those cases in which the 
overall cost of discovery is low enough that sampling would not serve a 
significant cost-saving purpose. For instance, in Semsroth v. City of 
Wichita,148 where the expected cost of discovery was a mere $3,374.95, 
the court rejected sampling because it would not substantially reduce 
the cost of discovery. The cost of contested discovery was just too small 
to justify sampling. Second, in many cases courts have selected a sample 
not based on cost but on size. For instance, a court might order 
production of a fifth of the backup tapes, not the production of as many 
tapes as can be “bought” for a fifth of the discovery costs.149 In other 
words, the value of the PerCostDisc metric may be that it indicates a 
judicial hesitation to order sampling where it would not represent a 
sufficient cost savings. In any event, there is a significant correlation 
between that metric and the decision to sample. 
We also examined whether the type of cost-minimization analysis 
being conducted had any effect on the decision to sample (i.e., does 
cost-shifting versus cut-off-of-discovery analysis make a difference?). 
There is, however, no identifiable correlation between the type of 
analysis and the decision to sample. In sum, it appears that the total 
amount in controversy, the total cost of discovery, and arguably the 
 
 148 239 F.R.D. 630, 638–40 (D. Kan. 2006). 
 149 There is reason to believe that the marginal cost of producing backup tapes decreases 
with each increase in the number of tapes that are produced, as there are fixed costs associated 
with production that will be imposed irrespective of whether one or one hundred tapes are 
produced. Accordingly, a court’s decision to order the sampling of a fifth of relevant backup 
tapes does not mean the court necessarily believes it is ordering an imposition of a fifth of the 
costs of total production. 
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presence of the government as a party (although this conclusion isn’t 
necessarily borne out by the data) influence a court’s decision to sample. 
b.     How Courts Sample 
In most cases in which sampling is considered by a court, a “best 
case scenario” (as utilized in Zubulake) or court-order methodology (as 
used in McPeek) is employed. Specifically, as indicated in Table 4, in 
31.25% of cases the court adopted a “best case scenario” method, and in 
37.5% of cases a court-order method was used. 
Table 4 
Methodology Used 
Method # of Cases 
Best Case Scenario 
Approach 
10 Cases (31.25%) 
Court Order Approach 12 Cases (37.5%) 
Stipulation Approach 7 Cases (21.88%) 
Scientific Approach 3 Cases (9.38%) 
However, the data reveals a clear division in how courts sample, 
and courts have provided little if any justification for why they have 
adopted the sampling method being utilized. For instance, we found no 
discussion of whether an approach letting the requesting party select the 
sample is preferable to one in which the court selects the sample. 
Moreover, despite the fact that in many cases the purpose of sampling is 
to inform a subsequent cost-shifting analysis by a court, no court has 
considered whether a court-ordered sample is preferable to a sample 
selected by agreement of the parties. While courts discussing a scientific 
methodology have provided a more substantive gloss on their 
approaches, these discussions usually only appear in the form of 
criticizing ad hoc approaches to sampling without providing any 
complete scientific framework for sampling.150 
A series of statistical analyses of this data revealed no statistically 
significant results; that is, no readily identifiable correlation between 
any of the aforementioned independent variables and a court’s choice of 
 
 150 See In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., Nos. 06-30378, 06-30379, 2006 WL 1726675, at *2 n.5 
(5th Cir. May 26, 2006) (“By random sampling, we mean adhering to a statistically sound 
protocol for sampling documents . . . . The parties must provide expert assistance to the district 
court in constructing any protocol.”); Am. Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. of Chi. v. Equitable Life 
Assurance Soc’y, 406 F.3d 867, 879 (7th Cir. 2005) (per curiam). 
2012] D I S C O V E R Y  A BO UT  D I S CO V E R Y  759 
methodology. This result is unsurprising. As our descriptive analysis of 
the cases indicates, the choice of sampling methodology appears to be 
entirely case-by-case, and often without consideration of the 
methodological strengths of any particular sampling approach. This 
point was put well by the Supreme Court of Oklahoma: 
The parties . . . do not discuss either the varying methods of selecting 
particular files for sampling or the proper discoverable information 
in those files that would necessarily support the litigation objective of 
[p]laintiffs. They may, or may not, agree to a particular method. No 
authority is cited in support of placing a burden on the trial court to 
create, sua sponte, a statistical sampling discovery technique for 
parties.151 
In short, very little guidance is available from the courts as to how 
to administer sampling and what sort of methodology to use. The data 
confirm such a characterization. 
c.     In Which Cases Are Costs Then Shifted? 
After courts sample, the data suggests that they are more likely to 
shift costs or cut-off discovery. Specifically, in 55.55% of cases in which 
sampling was contemplated, costs were later shifted. These results, 
displayed in Table 5, are significant at the p > 0.05 level.152 
Table 5 
When Are Costs Then Shifted? 
 Costs Shifted 
Costs Not 
Shifted 
Sampling Ordered 10 Cases (55.55%) 
4 Cases 
(22.22%) 
Sampling Not Ordered 0 Cases 4 Cases (22.22%) 
The results in Table 5 suggest that sampling is ordered in cases in 
which the court has doubts as to the importance of the information 
sought through extended electronic discovery. Presumably, the high 
percentage of costs shifted (55.55%) represents cases where the sample 
showed little if any relevance to the facts of the case. 
 
 151 Farmers Ins. Co. v. Peterson, 81 P.3d 659, 661 (Okla. 2003). 
 152 Using a Fisher’s Exact Test these results are significant (p > 0.023, one-tailed, 0.023, two-
tailed). Notably, though, because of some incompleteness in the data we only have observations 
for eighteen cases. 
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The only other variables that have a significant effect on the 
decision to cut-off discovery or shift costs are the total cost of discovery 
and the percent of the amount of controversy that is equal to the total 
cost discovery. Those results are displayed in Table 6. 
Table 6 
Effect of Costs on Cost-Shifting Analysis 





Total Cost of 
Discovery (CostDisc) .2912923 0.043 





The presence of the government as a party,153 asymmetric 
discovery obligations,154 the total amount in controversy,155 or whether 
the analysis was to shift costs or cut-off discovery, had insignificant 
effects on the decision to cut-off discovery or shift costs.156 These results 
are consistent with our description of cost-shifting analysis articulated 
herein: courts appear to examine the results of sampling along with the 
total cost of discovery and the percent of the total amount in 
controversy (in addition to other factors) in deciding whether to shift 
costs. 
III.     NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS OF THE ANALYSIS: RECOMMENDED “BEST 
PRACTICES” FOR SAMPLING 
A.     The Decision to Sample 
The discovery rules themselves, as well as our prior discussion in 
Part I, indicate that the decision to sample should operate as a function 
of two sets of factors: those relating to costs and those involving 
 
 153 P > 0.201, one-tailed, 0.321, two-tailed. 
 154 P > 0.563, one-tailed, 1.000, two-tailed. 
 155 P > 0.712 (see Table 6). 
 156 P > 0.352, one-tailed, 0.630, two-tailed. 
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uncertainty regarding the relevance and importance of the information 
sought. The proportionality standard prescribes an explicit balancing 
test in which the expenses or burdens of proposed discovery are 
weighed against its likely benefit. Sampling is appropriate when that 
technique is likely to provide the court with more information on one or 
both of those elements in a cost-effective manner. 
Our empirical study has shown that the total amount in 
controversy (i.e., the size of the litigation) and the total cost of discovery 
have a significant correlation with the decision to sample. That is, as the 
total amount in controversy and cost of discovery rise, it is more likely 
that a court will order sampling. These results are significant at the p > 
0.05 level. These findings make intuitive sense. Litigation needs to be of 
a great enough size and scope so as to justify relatively expansive 
discovery. When the amount at stake is small, plaintiffs have relatively 
little incentive to engage in extensive discovery, and defendants have 
strong arguments for resisting any such requests. There is an even 
stronger intuitive relationship between the cost of discovery, the ratio of 
discovery costs to total amount in controversy, and the decision to 
sample. If discovery costs are low, or the ratio of discovery to amount in 
controversy is low, the balance between cost and benefit is likely to favor 
even marginally relevant discovery. In such circumstances the potential 
cost savings offered by the sampling technique is unnecessary. 
Conversely, when discovery costs are high, whether in an absolute 
sense or as a ratio to the total amount in controversy, the balancing 
required by the proportionality test will be harder to perform, since it 
will be necessary to determine not merely whether the information is 
relevant, but whether it is sufficiently important to the litigation to 
justify the substantial added costs. Sampling, as we have seen, can 
frequently provide such finely nuanced insight into the information 
being sought. Moreover, when costs of discovery are high, in either an 
absolute or relative sense, the utility of the sampling technique increases 
because it provides information at a relatively lower cost. McPeek and 
Zubulake were both cases where the costs of the requested discovery 
were substantial enough to justify a preliminary inquiry or fact-finding 
into the requested discovery. 
It seems unwise to prescribe any strict cut-off in the size of the 
litigation or in the absolute or relative cost of discovery necessary to 
justify sampling.157 Given the wide variety of cases that may be 
presented to a court, and the frequent difficulty of determining the true 
amount at stake in various kinds of litigation, this is best left to the 
individual judge. Nonetheless, courts should be aware of cases like 
 
 157 A lower threshold for a sampling procedure may also be appropriate when the discovery 
is sought from a third party. See, e.g., In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum 
Prods. Antitrust Litig., 669 F.2d 620, 623–24 (10th Cir. 1982). 
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Semsroth158 and Parkdale,159 where the discovery issues were resolved 
without sampling and the cost of the discovery sought was $3,374.95 
and less than $20,000 respectively. In contrast, the discovery sought in 
Zubulake was estimated at $175,000, which was 1.35% of plaintiff’s 
maximum compensatory recovery of $13 million.160 Certainly, cases 
with discovery disputes in the Zubulake cost range or higher would be 
appropriate candidates for the sampling technique. 
A second relevant consideration relating to cost is the degree of 
certainty with which the costs of discovery can be determined. In cases 
where the actual costs of the discovery are substantially disputed or are 
otherwise uncertain,161 sampling provides an effective method for 
providing a more reliable cost estimate. This may sometimes be 
necessary to determine if the threshold requirement of Rule 26(b)(2)(B) 
of “undue burden or cost” is met, or to more effectively apply the 
proportionality test of Rule 26(b)(2)(C). The McPeek case provides an 
example of a court ordering sampling to give itself better information 
about the cost, as well as the likely benefit, of the discovery sought.162 
The second set of factors to be considered in deciding whether to 
sample relate to the likely content of the information sought. There are 
two relevant inquiries regarding this matter. First, there must be 
sufficient uncertainty as to the contents of the discovery in dispute, such 
that reducing uncertainty and obtaining better information about the 
likely content of the information sought will substantially aid the court 
in resolving the discovery dispute.163 This factor is ultimately addressed 
by the subjective confidence level of the judge deciding the discovery 
motion.164 In cases where a judge is confident, based on prior discovery, 
 
 158 Semsroth v. City of Wichita, 239 F.R.D. 630, 638 (D. Kan. 2006). 
 159 Parkdale Am., LLC v. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am., No. 3:06CV78, 2007 WL 
4165247, at *9 (W.D.N.C. Nov. 19, 2007). 
 160 Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 312 n.9. 
 161 Note in Zubulake, for example, that defendants’ initial estimated cost of $300,000 to 
restore the e-mails on the backup tapes was later reduced to $175,000. Id. at 312–33. 
 162 In McPeek, Magistrate Judge Facciola required that the Department of Justice, the 
producing party, “carefully document the time and money spent in doing the search” and 
“[u]pon the completion of this search . . . then file a comprehensive, sworn certification of the 
time and money spent and the results of the search.” 202 F.R.D. 31, 35 (D.D.C. 2001). 
 163 See Brokaw v. Davol, Inc., No. 07-5058, 2011 WL 579039, at n.7 (R.I. Super. Ct. Feb. 15, 
2011) (declining to sample where plaintiffs “have . . . provided the Court with examples of the 
information that they hope to find”). 
 164 There is extensive literature on subjective probability judgments and confidence intervals 
regarding those judgments. See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Subjective Probability: A 
Judgment of Representativeness, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 
32 (Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky eds., 1982); Charles Yablon, The Meaning 
of Probability Judgments: An Essay on the Use and Misuse of Behavioral Economics, 2004 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 899. For our purposes, it is sufficient to note that the literature makes a distinction 
between an individual’s probability judgment as the likelihood of the occurrence of an event 
and an individual’s confidence that their probability judgment is correct. For example, I may 
believe there is a 1/6 chance that a single die will roll a six on the next roll, but my confidence in 
that probability judgment is close to 100%. Alternatively, I may believe the Mets have a 
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testimony, or the arguments of the parties, that there is likely to be 
relevant information in the requested files of sufficient importance to 
meet the proportionality test, sampling is unnecessary and 
inappropriate. Likewise, where the evidence (or lack thereof) has already 
convinced the judge that the requested discovery is unlikely to contain 
any information sufficient to meet the proportionality test, sampling is 
similarly inappropriate.165 In short, a significant level of uncertainty as 
to the contents of the information sought is a precondition for 
sampling. That said, because we believe that sampling is a useful and 
flexible tool that can improve the quality of judicial decision-making, we 
would encourage its use whenever a judge believes that her confidence 
in the correctness of her decision on the motion can be significantly 
increased by information obtained through sampling. 
This brings us to the second merits-based factor—the ability of 
sampling to provide information that will substantially improve the 
accuracy of the decision-making. Specifically, in ordering sampling, a 
judge must reasonably believe that the sample will substantially or 
wholly alleviate the uncertainty about the requested discovery. The 
results of the sample must give the judge markedly greater confidence 
that the requested discovery does or does not contain information of 
sufficient importance to meet the proportionality test. Put another way, 
there must be a reasonable likelihood that a sample of a size within the 
generally accepted scale166 will produce enough information to eliminate 
substantial uncertainty as to the contents of the requested discovery. If 
such a sampling would be insufficient to resolve such questions, there is 
little reason to proceed with the sampling even if uncertainty is present 
as to the requested documents’ contents. 
For example, suppose the discovery dispute involves a single 
“smoking gun” e-mail, allegedly sent from defendant to plaintiff 
“sometime in the summer of 2005.” Plaintiff swears he saw it (on an 
office computer system to which he no longer has access); defendant 
swears it never existed. There is undisputed testimony that the only 
place the e-mail might still exist is in the backup tapes of the office 
computer, which will cost $100,000 to fully recover and search for the 
 
“reasonable likelihood” of being a pennant contender this year, but admit that my confidence 
in that probability judgment is quite low. Similarly, we believe that judges can distinguish 
between their assessment, at any given time, as to the likelihood of success of a discovery 
motion and their confidence as to the accuracy of that assessment. The factor we discuss here 
relates to that subjective assessment of accuracy. 
 165 Although, as we discuss later, the degree of unlikelihood of finding important evidence 
may be relevant to determining if the party seeking discovery is doing so in good faith or for 
harassment purposes (and therefore should be subject to cost-shifting, discovery cut-off, or 
sanctions), that inquiry relates primarily to the judge’s determination of the subjective good 
faith of the party seeking discovery based on the information available to that party at the time 
the motion. Accordingly, obtaining new information about that discovery through sampling 
will usually be neither necessary nor relevant. 
 166 See discussion infra Part III.B concerning the advisable size of a sample. 
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period June 2005 through September 2005. While the cost criteria for 
sampling are arguably met, and there is substantial uncertainty 
regarding the merits of the underlying discovery motion, we do not 
think this is a strong candidate for sampling. The reason is that 
examination of 15% to 25% of the requested files is unlikely to 
sufficiently reduce the uncertainty regarding the existence of the 
“smoking gun” e-mail. Because it involves only a single e-mail, 
searching, for instance, the June 2005 e-mails and finding nothing will 
not substantially diminish the likelihood that the e-mail will be found in 
the July, August, or September files. Put another way, the three months 
of files that do not contain the e-mail are not expected to be 
representative of the files for the month in which the email may exist.167 
This example therefore provides illustration of a critical point—
sampling works best, and is most likely to be ordered, when there is 
good reason to believe that the contents of the materials sampled are 
representative or over-representative168 of the contents of the entire set 
of materials sought in discovery. It is only when such representativeness 
exists that sampling is likely to be a cost-effective way to provide 
increased accuracy in decision-making. The importance of this factor 
reflects our view that sampling serves an information-gathering 
function and should not be thought of as a mere incrementalization of 
discovery. If it cannot provide substantially improved information to a 
court in a cost-effective manner, it is of little utility.169 
In sum, courts should order sampling when there is a significant 
level of uncertainty as to the contents of the information sought, the size 
of the litigation and cost of discovery are sufficiently large, and when 
sampling has the potential to substantially alleviate the uncertainty 
surrounding the requested discovery. As to the procedures for ordering 
 
 167 Of course, from a purely mathematical point of view, the fact that the e-mail did not exist 
in the June files makes it somewhat less likely that it exists at all, but that result is also 
consistent with a belief to a high degree of probability that it exists in the files of one of the 
other months. In this context, Bayes Theorem may be of use in deriving conditional 
probabilities—that is, probabilities that a given fact about the world is true (e.g., “those files 
contain important new information”) given the observation of some other fact or piece of 
evidence (e.g., “the sample does not contain any important new information”). Proponents of 
the use of Bayes Theorem argue that it provides a rational method for arriving at probability 
judgments with respect to both objective, frequentist probabilities, and subjective probability 
judgments like those judges make in deciding individual cases. There are ongoing arguments 
among scholars as to whether Bayes Theorem accurately depicts decision-making and should 
be used more frequently in deciding legal issues. For the purposes of this Article, we are 
agnostic on all these issues. Nonetheless, we believe that Bayes Theorem can be useful in 
illustrating certain points made earlier in this paper by providing mathematical models of 
different examples of decision-making by judges utilizing the sampling procedure. The 
equations and examples of such an application are set out in Appendix A, infra. 
 168 The significance of over-representation is discussed infra Part III.B. 
 169 A court conceptualizing sampling as a mechanism to phase discovery in order to 
constrain costs—an approach we do not endorse—would not likely consider this factor, as the 
phased approach does not concentrate on overcoming information deficits but rather is focused 
exclusively on cost minimization. See infra Part I.C. 
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sampling, we believe, as previously stated, that sampling is a technique 
that judges may or may not choose to utilize. As such, its use is solely 
within the judge’s discretion and may never be claimed by a party as of 
right. Nonetheless, parties either making or resisting discovery motions 
are free to suggest to the court that sampling might be an appropriate 
technique for resolving difficult discovery issues, and might even 
provide data concerning costs of discovery, costs of sampling, suggested 
sampling techniques, etc. 
Such suggestions for sampling will frequently be a tactical two-
edged sword. As we have seen, suggesting sampling means that you 
believe the court is experiencing a significant level of uncertainty as to 
whether to grant or deny the motion (something litigants are frequently 
reluctant to concede), and that information obtained from sampling will 
help resolve the dispute. On the other hand, when both parties feel they 
have a great deal riding on a discovery motion, the outcome of which is 
uncertain, they may find it in their mutual interest to jointly suggest not 
only that the court order sampling prior to deciding the motion, but 
also might be able to agree on a proposed sampling protocol that 
balances the cost-saving and information-gathering aspects of the 
sampling technique to the satisfaction of both parties. Such agreements 
as to sampling would not only represent useful examples of cooperation 
among parties with respect to electronic discovery, but are also very 
likely to be accepted by the court. 
Whether the parties agree or disagree as to the utility of sampling 
in their initial motion papers, they should each be free to make 
additional arguments regarding that motion once the results of such 
sampling are known. This would be in accordance with the two-part 
briefing procedure we suggest in the following Sections. 
B.     Method of Sampling 
Our theoretical discussion in Part I argued that since sampling is 
best understood as a cost-effective technique for more accurately 
resolving discovery disputes, the optimal sample size is the one that 
provides the most additional information to the court at the lowest cost. 
Our empirical analysis in Part II has revealed that in cases in which the 
cost of sampling exceeded 25% of the total cost of discovery, courts did 
not order sampling. Likewise, where the costs of sampling would be less 
than or equal to 25% of the total cost of discovery, a sample was 
ordered. Among those cases in which sampling was ordered, the sample 
on average was 14.46% of the total cost of the discovery. Thus, it would 
appear that courts have adopted a 25% threshold with a preference for 
ordering a sample consisting of about 15% of the total cost of 
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discovery.170 
While this 15% to 25% sample size can be viewed as another 
prerequisite for the ordering of sampling, the size of the sample to be 
ordered is obviously malleable in a way that other sampling criteria are 
not. That is, while the judge, in making her sampling order, cannot 
affect the amount in controversy in the litigation, the cost of discovery 
sought, or even the degree of uncertainty that exists with respect to the 
importance of the information sought, she can, and indeed must, 
determine what percentage of the information will be subject to 
sampling. In setting the parameters and size of a sample, a court should 
adhere to the general principle of trying to maximize information at the 
lowest possible cost. 
This makes especially salient the facts found in Part II, that in cases 
in which sampling is ordered, the average sample costs 15% of the total 
cost of discovery. Further, we also found that 25% is the upper limit for 
ordering sampling, with no court ordering sampling at a cost exceeding 
that threshold. This data strongly suggests that the courts themselves 
feel that the sampling technique ceases to be cost effective at percentages 
above 25%, and that a range of about 15% of the costs of discovery 
sought is likely to be optimal. These percentages certainly make sense in 
light of the criteria we have previously outlined for use of the sampling 
technique. Samples much below 15% would be unlikely to provide 
confidence that they accurately reflect all the types of information 
contained in the files sought.171 Samples above 25% are likely to involve 
added costs for diminishing returns. Accordingly, while we believe there 
should be no absolute minimum or maximum cost threshold for the size 
of a sample, we view the 15% to 25% range as a useful guideline for 
ensuring the sample provides adequate information about the totality of 
the requested documents while not imposing unnecessary costs. 
Note also that our empirical study and our proposed guidelines 
both look at the sample size in terms of relative cost of discovery rather 
than quantity of material reviewed. Of course, courts that have ordered 
sampling have not always conceived of sample size in cost-based terms. 
Courts will often order sampling based on a percentage of the total 
number of backup tapes at issue. Yet we believe thinking about the size 
of sampling in monetary terms makes good sense, particularly with 
respect to electronic discovery. This is because the marginal cost of 
producing backup tapes decreases with each increase in the number of 
 
 170 See AAB Joint Venture v. United States, 75 Fed. Cl. 432, 444 (Fed. Cl. 2007) (“The Court 
believes that restoration of one-fourth of the total back-up tapes should be adequate to 
determine whether the tapes are likely to possess relevant evidence.”). 
 171 It is true that randomized scientific surveys can often provide accurate data regarding 
certain characteristics of a population based on much smaller sample sizes, but, as we discuss in 
the next Section, such scientific surveys usually have a more limited purpose, and one that is 
not exactly the same as a purpose of most sampling inquiries. 
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tapes because there are fixed costs relating to production that are 
imposed irrespective of the number of tapes that are ultimately 
produced. In that sense, the first tape is always the most costly. 
Accordingly, basing the size of the sample on a percentage of the total 
number of backup tapes instead of the total cost of discovery may yield 
sampling that is not fully representative of the costs related to discovery. 
Some courts may have shied away from basing size in monetary terms 
because courts lacked sufficient information to issue an order based on 
such a metric. Our suggested approach would have the court seek to 
ascertain, prior to issuing a sampling order, whether information on 
marginal per unit costs is available and if so, to utilize that in the 
sampling order. If that information is not readily available, the court 
should ascertain whether it can be developed as part of the sampling 
inquiry itself. The fact that most sampling decisions thus far have 
ordered samples in the 15% to 25% range based on discovery costs, 
strongly suggests cost is the appropriate criteria for evaluating sample 
size. 
In Part II, we also noted that courts have utilized a number of 
different and inconsistent methods for determining how the sample files 
or information are selected for review. We divided the cases into four 
broad categories of methodology: 
1) Best Case Scenario, in which the party requesting documents 
selects the backup tapes or files it believes are most likely to contain 
important information that would satisfy the proportionality standard. 
The requesting party has exclusive control over choosing which files are 
part of the sample, subject only to sample size limitations imposed by a 
court. 
2) Scientific Sampling, in which the court orders a sample based on 
randomized selection of files or documents so as to produce a 
statistically reliable sample whose characteristics are likely to reflect that 
of the larger population from which it was selected at some statistical 
confidence interval. 
3) Parties Stipulation, in which the sample reflects an agreement 
between the parties as to the amount and type of information or files 
that will be sampled. This approach is functionally equivalent to private 
agreements to sample, subject to limited oversight by courts. 
4) Court Order, in which the court simply orders a sample of a 
particular size and type, and which may reflect all, some, or none of the 
considerations involved in Best Case Scenario, Scientific Sampling, and 
Parties Stipulation methodologies. 
Our empirical study found that recent cases have used all four 
methodologies, and that the choice of methodology did not appear to be 
correlated with any other independent variable to a statistically 
significant degree. This was also consistent with the language of the 
cases themselves, which rarely discussed the question of which 
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methodology to use or sought to defend the particular methodology 
selected. Nonetheless, our empirical study did show that far more judges 
opted for the “best case scenario” or “court order” methodology172 than 
sought to utilize “scientific sampling.”173 This may appear surprising 
given the vast importance of statistical analysis in most areas of 
academic social scientific inquiry, increasingly including law.174 
Moreover, some of the cases utilizing scientific sampling were among 
the few that attempted to justify their choice of methodology.175 
While the apparent popularity of the best case scenario and court 
order methodologies may reflect, in part, the enormous influence of the 
Zubulake case (which can be seen as a application of both those 
methods), we believe their popularity, and the reluctance of courts to 
employ scientific sampling methods, is not only understandable, but, in 
many cases, normatively preferable. Often it will be “best case scenario” 
not “scientific” sampling that is likely to provide the most useful 
information to the court at the lowest cost. The reason for this is simple. 
Scientific sampling is a statistical methodology whose fundamental goal 
is to ensure that the sample analyzed is representative of the larger 
population about which information is sought. In the context of 
resolving a discovery dispute, however, a judge may rationally seek a 
sample that is over-representative of the total population with respect to 
documents with particular characteristics. That is, if the judge is seeking 
to determine whether the information contained in the discovery sought 
is likely to contain documents of sufficient importance to justify the 
costs of discovery, a sample with a greater than average number of the 
most important documents may be more helpful in making that 
determination than a scientifically selected, representative sample. This 
is because the over-representative sample provides the court with more 
information about the particular documents about which it is most 
interested, the ones most likely to be important to the case. A scientific 
sample, in contrast, would provide fewer of the important documents, 
but at the same time provide a more reliable estimate of the total 
number of such documents that are likely to be in the discovery sought. 
A simple example can illustrate the trade-off involved. Assume you 
are a magazine writer, thinking about researching and writing a story 
 
 172 Ten of the cases in the study (31.25%) utilize “best case scenario” methodology. Another 
twelve (37.5%) involved a “court order” methodology. 
 173 Only three cases (9.38%) utilized “scientific sampling.” 
 174 See generally DAVID W. BARNES & JOHN M. CONLEY, STATISTICAL EVIDENCE IN 
LITIGATION: METHODOLOGY, PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE (1986); MORRIS DEGROOT, STEPHEN 
E. FIENBERG & JOSEPH B. KADANE, STATISTICS AND THE LAW (1986); STEPHEN E. FIENBERG, 
THE EVOLVING ROLE OF STATISTICAL ASSESSMENTS AS EVIDENCE IN THE COURTS, REPORT OF 
THE PANEL ON STATISTICAL ASSESSMENTS AS EVIDENCE IN THE COURTS (1989); MICHAEL O. 
FINKELSTEIN, QUANTITATIVE METHODS IN LAW: STUDIES IN THE APPLICATION OF 
MATHEMATICAL PROBABILITY AND STATISTICS TO LEGAL PROBLEMS (1978). 
 175 See, e.g., In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., Nos. 06-30378, 06-30379, 2006 WL 1726675, at *2 
n.5 (5th Cir. May 26, 2006) (per curiam). 
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about octogenarian surfers in California for Sports Illustrated. You think 
the story could be worth investigating, but you are unsure that there are 
any octogenarian surfers, and if so, whether they are sufficiently 
interesting to make a good story. One way to research the story 
(assuming you are stuck on the east coast) would be to get a list of 
California octogenarians (perhaps from the California AARP), call a 
substantial number at random, and ask whether any of them surf. 
Assuming the sample were large enough, this would enable you to 
estimate, with scientific accuracy, the number of octogenarian surfers in 
the state of California. Unfortunately, it would probably also result in 
your speaking to very few octogenarian surfers. A better approach might 
be to limit your sample to octogenarians with addresses in Malibu, on 
the theory that most octogenarian surfers, and certainly most interesting 
octogenarian surfers, are likely to live in Malibu and similar 
communities. The over-representativeness of the sample is precisely the 
point. You will be able to find out more information about more 
octogenarian surfers for the same expenditure of time and effort. This 
will enable you to make a better determination as to whether the story is 
worth pursuing. One thing you will not be able to do, however, based on 
your skewed sample, is accurately estimate the total number of 
octogenarian surfers in California, but that was not the purpose of your 
inquiry. 
Judges considering use of sampling are also generally looking to 
gather as much information as possible about documents with unique 
characteristics, i.e. importance to the case, which like octogenarian 
surfers, are at best rare within the population being searched, and may 
not exist at all. In such circumstances, if there is good reason to believe 
that one segment of the population for which discovery is sought is 
likely to contain an over-representative sample of such documents, the 
principle of maximizing information to the judge in the most cost-
effective manner would require that the over-representative, “best case 
scenario” approach be applied. 
This analysis not only explains our finding of a preference for “best 
case scenario” over scientific methodology in most of the reported cases, 
it also explains the use of the scientific approach in a minority of cases. 
In the three cases in our survey in which scientific methods of sampling 
were utilized or endorsed, the purpose for which the sample was sought 
was quite different from most of the other cases. It was to test the 
accuracy or reliability of certain word searching protocols to ensure that 
the populations being sampled actually contained documents with the 
characteristics they were supposed to contain. For example, D’Onofrio v. 
SFX Sports Group, Inc.176 involved a dispute over a privilege log that 
listed 9,413 documents withheld for privilege, work product, or other 
 
 176 256 F.R.D. 277, 278 (D.D.C. 2009). 
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reasons. At a hearing, it was agreed that plaintiff would be allowed to 
“test the validity of the privilege log using statistical sampling.” 
Plaintiff’s expert would be permitted to “select a representative sample, 
that would be made available to plaintiff’s counsel for his review to 
determine whether the privileges asserted were in fact appropriate.”177 
Note that in D’Onofrio, unlike Zubulake and similar cases, the judge was 
not interested in finding out as much as possible about a small subset of 
important documents within the population of documents sought to be 
discovered. Rather, he was concerned with whether defendant’s 
characterization of all the documents in the privilege log as privileged 
was accurate, and estimating, as accurately as possible, how many errors 
the privilege log contained. As we have noted, making such a 
determination requires scientific, statistical methods, precisely what the 
court in D’Onofrio ordered. The other cases utilizing or endorsing 
scientific sampling methodology involve similar concerns. They seek to 
use scientific sampling methods to test whether given word search 
protocols reliably produced populations of documents with the 
characteristics the parties claimed.178 
A number of general principles emerge from the foregoing 
analysis: 
1) In situations such as Zubulake, where the court is seeking as 
much information as possible about the likely contents of the 
documents being sought in order to determine their importance to the 
litigation, the court should seek to select a sample which is most likely to 
contain the largest number of such important documents. 
2) This is preferably done by agreement of the parties, recognizing 
that the party seeking discovery generally has an interest in producing a 
sample that has the greatest likelihood of containing important 
documents and the party opposing discovery generally has an interest in 
minimizing the costs of the sample. Nonetheless, if the parties fail to 
reach agreement, or if the judge believes the sample recommended by 
the parties will not provide maximum information about the contents of 
the requested discovery at minimum cost, the judge may order a 
different sample, based either on recommendations of the party seeking 
discovery alone, or on the basis of any other information available to the 
court. 
 
 177 Id. at 279. 
 178 See Victor Stanley, Inc. v. Creative Pipe, Inc., 250 F.R.D. 251, 256–57 (D. Md. 2008) 
(criticizing the defendant’s keyword search for privileged documents for not being tested by 
statistical sampling). “The only prudent way to test the reliability of the keyword search is to 
perform some appropriate sampling of the documents determined to be privileged and those 
determined not to be in order to arrive at a comfort level that the categories are neither over-
inclusive nor under-inclusive.” Id. at 257; see also William A. Gross Constr. Assocs., Inc. v. Am. 
Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., 256 F.R.D. 134, 136 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (stating that “common sense” requires 
that sampling must be employed in determining the completeness of keyword search 
protocols). 
2012] D I S C O V E R Y  A BO UT  D I S CO V E R Y  771 
3) However, if the purpose of the sample is not to obtain as much 
information as possible about the likely contents of the documents 
being sought in order to determine their importance to the litigation, 
but rather, to determine the extent to which an entire set of documents 
being sought or withheld from discovery actually have a certain 
characteristic (e.g. privilege, relevance) then scientific sampling 
techniques based on representative samples should be utilized. 
A final methodological issue—one that has received almost no 
discussion from courts179—is which party should pay for the sampling. 
For a number of reasons, we believe that the correct approach is for the 
responding party (the party opposing discovery) to pay for the actual 
production of the sample. First, it appears from our survey that this is 
the procedure currently being followed by courts that order sampling. 
Second, as we noted in Part I, the basic presumption of the federal 
discovery rules remains that the producing party bears its own costs. 
Although we have resisted the notion that sampling represents 
partial or incremental discovery, our analysis assumes that the judge is 
considering whether this is a case in which the traditional presumption 
should be altered (that is why she is utilizing sampling) but has not yet 
made any such determination. Accordingly, to shift costs at the sampling 
stage would be premature. However, there may be unusual 
circumstances in which the results of the sampling or other facts might 
lead courts to shift the costs of sampling to the requesting party.180 
C.     Briefs Regarding Sampling 
As previously noted, the original suggestion for sampling may 
come either from the court or from one or both of the parties. In either 
event, however, it is likely that the parties will have important 
information that will aid the court in determining whether to sample 
and shaping the sampling methodology. Accordingly, we envision a two 
 
 179 See supra notes 128, 130. 
 180 FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a)(5) does, of course, contain provisions that presumptively shift the 
cost of making discovery motions, including attorneys’ fees, on the party losing such motions. 
Such cost-shifting does not apply when the losing party’s position is “substantially justified” or 
when cost shifting is otherwise unfair. In situations where sampling is ordered, as we have seen, 
there must be sufficient uncertainty as to the appropriate result, such that both parties’ 
positions are likely to be substantially justified. Nonetheless, in a case in which sampling or 
other evidence reveals to the court that the party seeking discovery was essentially engaged in 
an abusive fishing expedition having no substantial justification for the discovery sought, then 
the cost-shifting provisions of FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a)(5) should result in a shifting of the cost of 
the sample as well as the other costs of the discovery motion. In making such a determination, 
as in other areas of the law, courts must be wary of the danger of “hindsight bias.” See generally 
Baruch Fischhoff, For Those Condemned to Study the Past: Heuristics and Biases in Hindsight, 
in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES, supra note 164, at 335; Jeffrey J. 
Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 571, 608–
15 (1998). 
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stage briefing procedure. The first stage of briefing would occur prior to 
the ordering of sampling and focus on whether to sample and how to 
shape the sampling protocol. Because, as previously noted, the parties 
may be reluctant initially to endorse sampling, and because sampling is 
ultimately the judge’s own “discovery about discovery,” the judge 
should feel free to direct the parties briefing to the particular issues on 
which she wants more information. For example, in considering 
application of a “best case scenario” methodology, the court might 
direct the moving party to submit a brief not just on whether sampling 
should be ordered, but, if the court were to order sampling, describing 
what that party would consider an optimum sample and why they 
believe the results of that sample will support their position with respect 
to the underlying discovery motion. The parties could be asked to 
confer on these proposals in an attempt to reach agreement on a 
sampling protocol, and if they cannot, the responding party would 
reply, perhaps with a counterproposal of its own. The responding party 
would also be expected to supply additional information regarding costs 
of production of requested samples of different sizes. Such information 
is often provided by expert affidavits or testimony. The other side could 
then respond to those cost estimates. At the end of this process, there 
might be an agreement between the parties or one or more sampling 
proposals tied to the costs and needs of the individual case. The court 
would then choose one of these sampling protocols or create its own 
based on the principle of maximizing information to the court in the 
most cost-effective manner. 
The second phase of the briefing would come after sampling has 
occurred and the parties have had a chance to review the sampled 
documents. These briefs would seek to show how the results of the 
sampling support the parties’ respective positions on the underlying 
discovery motion. 
D.     Interpreting and Applying the Results of Sampling 
The final unanswered question revealed by our study is when the 
results of sampling can support a decision to shift costs and when it can 
support an order cutting off further discovery. Both results are 
authorized under the Federal Rules in situations where the 
proportionality test is not met, and both results have been ordered by 
courts after analyzing the results of sampling. Indeed, of the two 
paradigmatic sampling cases, McPeek and Zubulake, the latter involved 
cost-shifting while the former resulted in a discovery cut-off. Neither 
case, nor the others in our sample, provides much explicit guidance on 
when each of these orders is appropriate. It appears that whether 
discovery costs were shifted or discovery cut-off frequently depended on 
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which result was requested by the party opposing the discovery. 
We believe that the greater, more nuanced information made 
available by sampling makes it unnecessary for the courts to choose 
between these two potential orders until it has analyzed the results of the 
sample. Specifically, we believe that whenever a court must decide 
whether a given discovery request meets the proportionality test, it 
should consider three possible results. When sampling reveals a 
substantial likelihood of important information in the requested 
discovery, making it likely that the requested discovery satisfies the 
proportionality standard, the court should order the discovery with 
production costs on the responding party. When sampling reveals little 
or no substantial likelihood of important information in the discovery 
sought, the court must make a finer-grained analysis. In circumstances 
where there is still some possibility the requested discovery might 
contain useful information and where the burden on the responding 
party can be largely or completely alleviated by having the requesting 
party bear the costs of production, cost-shifting should be ordered. This 
is a recognition that cost-shifting is a less preclusive and therefore 
generally preferable response to a discovery cut-off. Cost-shifting is less 
preclusive because it can be applied to various degrees (as the court did 
in Zubulake) and because it interferes less with the losing parties’ 
ultimate chance of success on the merits. A less preclusive remedy is 
preferable because, as we discussed in Part I, the court is still making 
merits-based determinations about the case on less than a full record 
and such prejudging should always be as tentative and reversible as 
possible. Cost-shifting, either in whole or in part, does not foreclose the 
discovery sought, but it does force the losing party to consider just how 
valuable that discovery is, and how much he wants to invest in 
furthering his cause. Moreover, the responding party, whose costs are 
now substantially covered, has far weaker grounds to object to 
producing information he claims has no importance to the case. 
Accordingly, while cost-shifting should be the applicable result for 
most requested discovery where sampling indicates the proportionality 
standard has not been met, the more preclusive option to cut-off 
discovery completely is also available to the court. Such discovery cut-
offs should be considered when the sample demonstrates that there is no 
reasonable likelihood of finding relevant information in the discovery 
sought, and that cost-shifting alone will not fully alleviate the burden on 
plaintiff of making production. While not quite a finding of discovery 
abuse or “fishing expedition,”181 this would amount to a finding that 
further discovery would serve no useful purpose. Although, given our 
 
 181 We believe that it is only upon a finding that a party has engaged in such abusive 
discovery that a court should consider an ex post reversal of the costs of the sample production. 
See supra note 180. 
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general concerns about prejudgments on the merits, such orders should 
be made sparingly, we also believe the added information available to 
the court through sampling will enable it to make such orders with 
assurance in the appropriate case. 
CONCLUSION 
As the first extensive theoretical and empirical analysis of sampling 
in e-discovery disputes, we intend this Article to be the beginning of a 
discussion among lawyers, judges, and academics. Accordingly, rather 
than conclude with a summary of previously made points, we prefer to 
conclude with the following two appendices, which we hope will 
promote further discussion of sampling as an important and rapidly 
developing feature of e-discovery. The first appendix illustrates some of 
our major points regarding the utility of sampling through the 
application of Bayes Theorem, showing that our arguments are 
consistent with Bayesian analysis, although not dependent on them. Our 
second appendix is a preliminary attempt at a recommended set of “best 
practices” for sampling procedures, which we hope will form the basis 
for further debate and refinement. 
APPENDIX A: AN APPLICATION OF BAYES THEOREM TO SAMPLING 
DECISIONS 
Bayes Theorem may be of some usefulness in analyzing conditional 
probabilities in a judge’s decision-making process.182 What follows are 
mathematical models of different examples of decision-making by 
judges utilizing the sampling procedure. The analysis of these examples 
are based on the following equation: 
 
 = X)|Pr(A  
 
For our purposes in these examples, the variables can be 
interpreted as follows: 
Pr(A|X) = Likelihood that no important documents exist in the 
files, given that no important documents were found in the sample. This 
is the determination the judge ultimately seeks to make. 
Pr(X|A) = Chance of a negative finding in the sample given that no 
important documents exist in the files. This will always be true in 
sampling cases, thereby giving this a value of 1. Accordingly, in our 
Bayesian analysis, the numerator will always equal Pr(A) 
 
 182 See supra note 167. 
A)Pr(~ A)|~Pr(X + Pr(A) A)|Pr(X
Pr(A) A)|Pr(X
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Pr(A) = Likelihood that no important documents exist in the files 
sought to be discovered. 
Pr(~A) = Likelihood that important files do exist in the files sought 
to be discovered 
Pr(X|~A) = Likelihood of a negative sampling result even if 
important documents exist in the files sought to be discovered. We can 
call this a “false negative,” the only kind of false result that can exist in 
this discovery context. 
Using this equation we evaluate the usefulness of sampling in a 
number of different situations: 
Example A: Little Uncertainty As to Motion, Sample Marginally Helpful 
in Reducing Uncertainty 
Consider the situation discussed infra in Part III.C where the judge 
strongly believes there is one, and only one, critical e-mail in the files, 
and it exists either in the June, July, August, or September files of the 
defendant. We said that it made little sense to sample in this case, since a 
negative finding with respect to June would do little to affect the judge’s 
view of the existence of important information. We can model the 
strong belief that a critical e-mail exists in the files by giving Pr(A) and 
Pr(~A) values of 0.1 and 0.9 respectively. If we assume the judge believes 
that critical email is equally likely to be found in the e-mails of any of 
the summer months, then the value of Pr(X|~A), the likelihood that the 
sample will show up negative even if the critical e-mail exists, is 0.75. 
Plugging these numbers into the equation gives us a value for Pr(A|X), 
the “posterior probability,” of 12.9%. In other words, the judge’s belief 
that there might not be important evidence in the entirety of the files 
sought has gone from 10% to slightly under 13%. Clearly, such sampling 
will not have a significant effect on the outcome of the discovery 
motion. 
Example B: Uncertainty As to Motion, Sample not Significantly Helpful 
in Reducing Uncertainty 
To model a judge who is uncertain regarding the discovery motion, 
but is leaning slightly toward granting it, we assigned prior probabilities 
Pr(A) and Pr(~A) of 0.4 and 0.6 respectively. To model a sample that is 
not strongly helpful in reducing uncertainty, we assumed a 50% 
likelihood of a false negative. These numbers give us a posterior 
probability of 57%. The judge’s belief that there might not be sufficiently 
important evidence in the entire file to justify granting the motion has 
changed from weakly negative (40%) to weakly positive (57%). A judge 
who knew beforehand that the results would be this inconclusive might 
776 C A R D O ZO  L AW  R E V I E W  [Vol. 34:719 
not bother to order sampling at all. On the other hand, judges frequently 
do not know what all the possible results of sampling might be, and 
therefore cannot know the true value of Pr(X|~A)183 prior to ordering 
the sample. Obtaining such a result, and therefore now believing that 
the evidence weakly favors the party objecting to discovery, the court 
might incline toward a weakly preclusive result, like shifting the costs of 
some percentage of the requested discovery. 
Example C: Uncertainty As to Motion, Sample Significantly Helpful  
in Reducing Uncertainty 
Here again, the judge’s uncertainty is modeled as prior 
probabilities Pr(A) and Pr(~A) of 0.4 and 0.6 respectively (slightly 
leaning towards granting the discovery). However, to model a sample 
that is of significant help in reducing uncertainty, we assume only a 20% 
likelihood of a false negative. That is, if the files contain the information 
the party seeking discovery claims is there, some of that information is 
very likely to show up in the sample. In these circumstances, failing to 
observe any such data in the sample will yield a posterior probability of 
76.9% that the requested files do not contain such data (even though the 
judge was mildly positive toward the motion to begin with). Here, 
sampling clearly serves its purpose of giving the judge greater insight 
and certainty concerning the motion pending before her. 
APPENDIX B: PROPOSED “BEST PRACTICES” FOR THE USE OF SAMPLING  
IN THE RESOLUTION OF DISCOVERY DISPUTES 
I.     THE DECISION TO ORDER SAMPLING 
Courts should order sampling when 1) the size of the litigation and 
cost of discovery are sufficiently large, 2) a significant level of 
uncertainty exists as to the contents of the information sought, and 3) 
sampling has the potential to substantially alleviate the uncertainty 
surrounding the requested discovery. 
There is no strict cut-off in the size of the litigation or in the 
absolute or relative cost of discovery necessary to justify sampling. 
 
 183 In this simplified model, there is a single sampling result X, which represents a finding of 
no important evidence. In the real world, of course, real sampling can produce many different 
potential results, such as the Zubulake finding of some marginally relevant evidence, but no 
“smoking guns.” Because the degree to which a sampling result will alleviate uncertainty 
frequently cannot be known in advance, sampling such as the one in this model may frequently 
be ordered. Once the sample has been taken, of course, the range of possible outcomes becomes 
narrowed to one, and it is possible to develop a posterior probability based on the actual 
outcome of the sample as indicated above. 
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However, discovery costs of $20,000 or less have been held not to 
warrant sampling, while discovery estimated at $175,000, which was 
1.35% of plaintiff’s maximum compensatory recovery of $13 million, 
was considered an appropriate candidate for the sampling technique. 
In cases where the actual costs of the discovery sought are 
substantially disputed or otherwise uncertain, sampling may provide a 
more reliable cost estimate. 
There must be sufficient uncertainty as to the contents of the 
discovery in dispute that reducing that uncertainty and obtaining better 
information about the likely content of the information sought will 
substantially aid the court in resolving the discovery dispute. This factor 
is ultimately addressed to the subjective confidence level of the judge 
deciding the discovery motion. 
A judge must reasonably believe that the sample will substantially 
or wholly alleviate the uncertainty about the requested discovery. 
Sampling should be used whenever a judge believes that her confidence 
in the correctness of her decision on the motion can be significantly 
increased by information obtained through sampling. 
II.     PROCEDURES FOR ORDERING SAMPLING 
The decision to order sampling is solely within the judge’s 
discretion and may never be claimed by a party as of right. Nonetheless, 
parties either making or resisting discovery motions are free to suggest 
to the court that sampling might be an appropriate technique for 
resolving difficult discovery issues, and may provide data concerning 
costs of discovery, costs of sampling, suggested sampling techniques, 
etc. 
Ordinarily, resolution of discovery disputes through sampling will 
involve a two-stage briefing procedure. The first stage of briefing would 
occur prior to the ordering of sampling and focus on whether to sample 
and how to shape the sampling protocol. The judge should feel free to 
direct the parties briefing to the particular issues on which she wants 
more information. 
The second phase of the briefing would come after sampling has 
occurred and the parties have had a chance to review the sampled 
documents. These briefs would seek to show how the results of the 
sampling support the parties’ respective positions on the underlying 
discovery motion. 
III.     METHODS OF SAMPLING 
Courts should utilize a sample size that maximizes information to 
the judge at the lowest possible cost. While there is no absolute 
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minimum or maximum cost threshold for the size of a sample, prior 
judicial practice indicates that a sample of 15% to 25% of the total cost 
of the discovery sought on the underlying motion provides adequate 
information about the totality of the requested documents while not 
imposing unnecessary costs. 
If possible, sample size should be based on a percentage of the total 
costs of the discovery sought. The court should seek to ascertain, prior 
to issuing a sampling order, whether information on marginal per unit 
costs is available and if so, to utilize that in the sampling order. If that 
information is not readily available, the court should ascertain whether 
it can be developed as part of the sampling inquiry itself. 
In situations where the court is seeking as much information as 
possible about the likely contents of the documents being sought in 
order to determine their importance to the litigation, the court should 
seek to select a sample which is most likely to contain the largest 
number of such important documents. This is preferably done by 
agreement of the parties, recognizing that the party seeking discovery 
generally has an interest in producing a sample that has the greatest 
likelihood of containing important documents and the party opposing 
discovery generally has an interest in minimizing the costs of the 
sample. Nonetheless, if the parties fail to reach agreement, or if the 
judge believes the sample recommended by the parties will not provide 
maximum information about the contents of the requested discovery at 
minimum cost, the judge may order a different sample, based either on 
recommendations of the party seeking discovery alone, or on the basis 
of any other information available to the court. 
If the purpose of the sample is not to obtain as much information 
as possible about the likely contents of the documents being sought in 
order to determine their importance to the litigation, but rather to 
determine the extent to which an entire set of documents being sought 
or withheld from discovery actually have a certain characteristic (e.g., 
privilege, relevance, etc.) then scientific sampling techniques based on 
representative samples should be utilized. 
The producing party should pay the costs of producing the sample, 
unless the sample results or other subsequent information reveals that 
the underlying discovery motion is subject to the cost-shifting provision 
of FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a)(5). 
IV.     APPLYING THE RESULTS OF SAMPLING 
When sampling reveals a substantial likelihood of important 
information in the requested discovery, the court should order the 
discovery with production costs on the responding party. 
When sampling reveals little or no substantial likelihood of 
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important information in the discovery sought, but there is still some 
possibility that the requested discovery might contain useful 
information, and where the burden on the responding party can be 
largely or completely alleviated by having the requesting party bear the 
costs of production, cost-shifting should be ordered. 
When sampling demonstrates that there is no reasonable 
likelihood of finding relevant information in the discovery sought, and 
that cost-shifting alone will not fully alleviate the burden on plaintiff of 
making production, a discovery cut-off may be ordered. 
 
